{
  "schema": "tga.work.v1",
  "identifier": "dresden:vol-6:ingersoll-gladstone-controversy",
  "slug": "ingersoll-gladstone-controversy",
  "title": "The Ingersoll–Gladstone Controversy",
  "subtitle": "Colonel Ingersoll on Christianity.",
  "excerpt": "William Ewart Gladstone — four-time Prime Minister of Britain — weighs in on the Ingersoll-Field debate, and Ingersoll replies across the Atlantic.",
  "year": 1888,
  "volume": 6,
  "category": "Discussion",
  "author": {
    "name": "Robert G. Ingersoll",
    "wikidata": "Q360326",
    "viaf": "44331023"
  },
  "isPartOf": {
    "title": "The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll",
    "edition": "Dresden Edition",
    "publisher": "C. P. Farrell",
    "year": 1900
  },
  "license": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/",
  "url": "https://thegreatagnostic.com/works/ingersoll-gladstone-controversy/",
  "wordCount": 28199,
  "body": "COLONEL INGERSOLL ON CHRISTIANITY; SOME REMARKS ON HIS REPLY TO DR.\nFIELD.\n\nBy Hon. Wm. E. Gladstone.\n\nAS a listener from across the broad Atlantic to the clash of arms in the\ncombat between Colonel Ingersoll and Dr. Field on the most momentous\nof all subjects, I have not the personal knowledge which assisted these\ndoughty champions in making reciprocal acknowledgments, as broad as\ncould be desired, with reference to personal character and motive. Such\nacknowledgments are of high value in keeping the issue clear, if not\nalways of all adventitious, yet of all venomous matter. Destitute of\nthe experience on which to found them as original testimonies, still,\nin attempting partially to criticise the remarkable Reply of Colonel\nIngersoll, I can both accept in good faith what has been said by Dr.\nField, and add that it seems to me consonant with the strain of the\npages I have set before me. Having said this, I shall allow myself the\nutmost freedom in remarks, which will be addressed exclusively to the\nmatter, not the man.\n\nLet me begin by making several acknowledgments of another kind, but\nwhich I feel to be serious. The Christian Church has lived long enough\nin external triumph and prosperity to expose those of whom it is\ncomposed to all such perils of error and misfeasance, as triumph\nand prosperity bring with them. Belief in divine guidance is not of\nnecessity belief that such guidance can never be frustrated by the\nlaxity, the infirmity, the perversity of man, alike in the domain of\naction and in the domain of thought. Believers in the perpetuity of the\nlife of the Church are not tied to believing in the perpetual health\nof the Church. Even the great Latin Communion, and that communion even\nsince the Council of the Vatican in 1870, theoretically admits, or does\nnot exclude, the possibility of a wide range of local and partial error\nin opinion as well as conduct. Elsewhere the admission would be more\nunequivocal. Of such errors in tenet, or in temper and feeling more\nor less hardened into tenet, there has been a crop alike abundant and\nmultifarious. Each Christian party is sufficiently apt to recognize this\nfact with regard to every other Christian party; and the more impartial\nand reflective minds are aware that no party is exempt from mischiefs,\nwhich lie at the root of the human constitution in its warped, impaired,\nand dislocated condition. Naturally enough, these deformities help\nto indispose men towards belief; and when this indisposition has been\ndeveloped into a system of negative warfare, all the faults of all the\nChristian bodies, and sub-divisions of bodies, are, as it was natural\nto expect they would be, carefully raked together, and become part and\nparcel of the indictment against the divine scheme of redemption. I\nnotice these things in the mass, without particularity, which might be\ninvidious, for two important purposes. First, that we all, who hold by\nthe Gospel and the Christian Church, may learn humility and modesty, as\nwell as charity and indulgence, in the treatment of opponents, from\nour consciousness that we all, alike by our exaggerations and our\nshortcomings in belief, no less than by faults of conduct, have\ncontributed to bring about this condition of fashionable hostility to\nreligious faith: and, secondly, that we may resolutely decline to be\nheld bound to tenets, or to consequences of tenets, which represent not\nthe great Christendom of the past and present, but only some hole and\ncorner of its vast organization; and not the heavenly treasure, but the\nrust or the canker to which that treasure has been exposed through the\nincidents of its custody in earthen vessels.\n\nI do not remember ever to have read a composition, in which the\nmerely local coloring of particular, and even very limited sections of\nChristianity, was more systematically used as if it had been available\nand legitimate argument against the whole, than in the Reply before us.\nColonel Ingersoll writes with a rare and enviable brilliancy, but also\nwith an impetus which he seems unable to control. Denunciation, sarcasm,\nand invective, may in consequence be said to constitute the staple of\nhis work; and, if argument or some favorable admission here and there\npeeps out for a moment, the writer soon leaves the dry and barren\nheights for his favorite and more luxurious galloping grounds beneath.\nThus, when the Reply has consecrated a line (N. A. R., No. 372, p. 473)\nto the pleasing contemplation of his opponent as \"manly, candid, and\ngenerous,\" it immediately devotes more than twelve to a declamatory\ndenunciation of a practice (as if it were his) altogether contrary to\ngenerosity and to candor, and reproaches those who expect (ibid.) \"to\nreceive as alms an eternity of joy.\" I take this as a specimen of\nthe mode of statement which permeates the whole Reply. It is not the\nstatement of an untruth. The Christian receives as alms all whatsoever\nhe receives at all. Qui salvandos salvas gratis is his song of\nthankful praise. But it is the statement of one-half of a truth, which\nlives only in its entirety, and of which the Reply gives us only a\nmangled and bleeding frustum. For the gospel teaches that the faith\nwhich saves is a living and energizing faith, and that the most precious\npart of the alms which we receive lies in an ethical and spiritual\nprocess, which partly qualifies for, but also and emphatically composes,\nthis conferred eternity of joy. Restore this ethical element to the\ndoctrine from which the Reply has rudely displaced it, and the whole\nforce of the assault is gone, for there is now a total absence of point\nin the accusation; it conies only to this, that \"mercy and judgment are\nmet together,\" and that \"righteousness and peace have kissed each other\"\n(Ps. lxxxv. 10).\n\nPerhaps, as we proceed, there will be supplied ampler means of judging\nwhether I am warranted in saying that the instance I have here given\nis a normal instance of a practice so largely followed as to divest\nthe entire Reply of that calmness and sobriety of movement which are\nessential to the just exercise of the reasoning power in subject matter\nnot only grave, but solemn. Pascal has supplied us, in the \"Provincial\nLetters,\" with an unique example of easy, brilliant, and fascinating\ntreatment of a theme both profound and complex. But where shall we find\nanother Pascal? And, if we had found him, he would be entitled to point\nout to us that the famous work was not less close and logical than it\nwas witty. In this case, all attempt at continuous argument appears to\nbe deliberately abjured, not only as to pages, but, as may almost be\nsaid, even as to lines. The paper, noteworthy as it is, leaves on my\nmind the impression of a battle-field where every man strikes at every\nman, and all is noise, hurry, and confusion. Better surely had it been,\nand worthier of the great weight and elevation of the subject, if the\ncontroversy had been waged after the pattern of those engagements where\na chosen champion on either side, in a space carefully limited and\nreserved, does battle on behalf of each silent and expectant host. The\npromiscuous crowds represent all the lower elements which enter\ninto human conflicts: the chosen champions, and the order of their\nproceeding, signify the dominion of reason over force, and its just\nplace as the sovereign arbiter of the great questions that involve the\nmain destiny of man.\n\nI will give another instance of the tumultuous method in which the\nReply conducts, not, indeed, its argument, but its case. Dr. Field had\nexhibited an example of what he thought superstition, and had drawn a\ndistinction between superstition and religion. But to the author of\nthe Reply all religion is superstition, and, accordingly, he writes as\nfollows (p. 475): \"You are shocked at the Hindoo mother, when she gives\nher child to death at the supposed command of her God. What do you think\nof Abraham? of Jephthah? What is your opinion of Jehovah himself?\"\n\nTaking these three appeals in the reverse order to that in which they\nare written, I will briefly ask, as to the closing challenge, \"What\ndo you think of Jehovah himself?\" whether this is the tone in which\ncontroversy ought to be carried on? Not only is the name of Jehovah\nencircled in the heart of every believer with the profoundest reverence\nand love, but the Christian religion teaches, through the Incarnation,\na doctrine of personal union with God so lofty that it can only be\napproached in a deep, reverential calm. I do not deny that a person\nwho deems a given religion to be wicked may be led onward by logical\nconsistency to impugn in strong terms the character of the Author and\nObject of that religion. But he is surely bound by the laws of social\nmorality and decency to consider well the terms and the manner of his\nindictment. If he founds it upon allegations of fact, these allegations\nshould be carefully stated, so as to give his antagonists reasonable\nevidence that it is truth and not temper which wrings from him a\nsentence of condemnation, delivered in sobriety and sadness, and\nnot without a due commiseration for those, whom he is attempting to\nundeceive, who think he is himself both deceived and a deceiver, but who\nsurely are entitled, while this question is in process of decision, to\nrequire that He whom they adore should at least be treated with those\ndecent reserves which are deemed essential when a human being, say\na parent, wife, or sister, is in question. But here a contemptuous\nreference to Jehovah follows, not upon a careful investigation of the\ncases of Abraham and of Jephthah, but upon a mere summary citation of\nthem to surrender themselves, so to speak, as culprits; that is to say,\na summons to accept at once, on the authority of the Reply, the view\nwhich the writer is pleased to take of those cases. It is true that he\nassures us in another part of his paper that he has read the scriptures\nwith care; and I feel bound to accept this assurance, but at the same\ntime to add that if it had not been given I should, for one, not\nhave made the discovery, but might have supposed that the author had\ngalloped, not through, but about, the sacred volume, as a man glances\nover the pages of an ordinary newspaper or novel.\n\nAlthough there is no argument as to Abraham or Jephthah expressed upon\nthe surface, we must assume that one is intended, and it seems to be of\nthe following kind: \"You are not entitled to reprove the Hindoo mother\nwho cast her child under the wheels of the car of Juggernaut, for\nyou approve of the conduct of Jephthah, who (probably) sacrificed his\ndaughter in fulfilment of a vow (Judges xi. 31) that he would make a\nburnt offering of whatsoever, on his safe return, he should meet coming\nforth from the doors of his dwelling.\" Now the whole force of this\nrejoinder depends upon our supposed obligation as believers to approve\nthe conduct of Jephthah. It is, therefore, a very serious question\nwhether we are or are not so obliged. But this question the Reply does\nnot condescend either to argue, or even to state. It jumps to an extreme\nconclusion without the decency of an intermediate step. Are not such\nmethods of proceeding more suited to placards at an election, than to\ndisquisitions on these most solemn subjects?\n\nI am aware of no reason why any believer in Christianity should not\nbe free to canvass, regret, condemn the act of Jephthah. So far as the\nnarration which details it is concerned, there is not a word of sanction\ngiven to it more than to the falsehood of Abraham in Egypt, or of\nJacob and Rebecca in the matter of the hunting (Gen. xx. 1-18, and Gen.\nxxiii.); or to the dissembling of St. Peter in the case of the Judaizing\nconverts (Gai. ii. 11). I am aware of no color of approval given to\nit elsewhere. But possibly the author of the Reply may have thought he\nfound such an approval in the famous eleventh chapter of the Epistle to\nthe Hebrews, where the apostle, handling his subject with a discernment\nand care very different from those of the Reply, writes thus (Heb. xi.\n32):\n\n\"And what shall I say more? For the time would fail me to tell of\nGideon, and of Barak, and of Samson, and of Jephthah: of David also, and\nSamuel, and of the prophets.\"\n\nJephthah, then, is distinctly held up to us by a canonical writer as an\nobject of praise. But of praise on what account? Why should the Reply\nassume that it is on account of the sacrifice of his child? The writer\nof the Reply has given us no reason, and no rag of a reason, in support\nof such a proposition. But this was the very thing he was bound by every\nconsideration to prove, upon making his indictment against the Almighty.\nIn my opinion, he could have one reason only for not giving a reason,\nand that was that no reason could be found.\n\nThe matter, however, is so full of interest, as illustrating both the\nmethod of the Reply and that of the Apostolic writer, that I shall enter\nfarther into it, and draw attention to the very remarkable structure of\nthis noble chapter, which is to Faith what the thirteenth of Cor. I. is\nto Charity. From the first to the thirty-first verse, it commemorates\nthe achievements of faith in ten persons: Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham,\nSarah, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses (in greater detail than any one\nelse), and finally Rahab, in whom, I observe in passing, it will hardly\nbe pretended that she appears in this list on account of the profession\nshe had pursued. Then comes the rapid recital (v. 31), without any\nspecification of particulars whatever, of these four names: Gideon,\nBarak, Samson, Jephthah. Next follows a kind of recommencement,\nindicated by the word also; and the glorious acts and sufferings of the\nprophets are set forth largely with a singular power and warmth, headed\nby the names of David and Samuel, the rest of the sacred band being\nmentioned only in the mass.\n\nNow, it is surely very remarkable that, in the whole of this recital,\nthe Apostle, whose \"feet were shod with the preparation of the gospel\nof peace,\" seems with a tender instinct to avoid anything like stress\non the exploits of warriors. Of the twelve persons having a share in the\ndetailed expositions, David is the only warrior, and his character as\na man of war is eclipsed by his greater attributes as a prophet, or\ndeclarer of the Divine counsels. It is yet more noteworthy that Joshua,\nwho had so fair a fame, but who was only a warrior, is never named in\nthe chapter, and we are simply told that \"by faith the walls of Jericho\nfell down, after they had been compassed about seven times\" (Hebrews\nxi. 30). But the series of four names, which are given without any\nspecification of their title to appear in the list, are all names\nof distinguished warriors. They had all done great acts of faith\nand patriotism against the enemies of Israel,—Gideon against the\nMidianites, Barak against the hosts of Syria, Samson against the\nPhilistines, and Jephthah against the children of Ammon. Their tide to\nappear in the list at all is in their acts of war, and the mode of their\ntreatment as men of war is in striking accordance with the analogies\nof the chapter. All of them had committed errors. Gideon had again and\nagain demanded a sign, and had made a golden ephod, \"which thing became\na snare unto Gideon and to his house\" (Judges viii. 27). Barak had\nrefused to go up against Jabin unless Deborah would join the venture\n(Judges v. 8). Samson had been in dalliance with Delilah. Last came\nJephthah, who had, as we assume, sacrificed his daughter in fulfilment\nof a rash vow. No one supposes that any of the others are honored by\nmention in the chapter on account of his sin or error: why should that\nsupposition be made in the case of Jephthah, at the cost of all the\nrules of orderly interpretation?\n\nHaving now answered the challenge as to Jephthah, I proceed to the\ncase of Abraham. It would not be fair to shrink from touching it in\nits tenderest point. That point is nowhere expressly touched by the\ncommendations bestowed upon Abraham in Scripture. I speak now of the\nspecial form, of the words that are employed. He is not commended\nbecause, being a father, he made all the preparations antecedent to\nplunging the knife into his son. He is commended (as I read the text)\nbecause, having received a glorious promise, a promise that his wife\nshould be a mother of nations, and that kings should be born of her\n(Gen. xvii. 6), and that by his seed the blessings of redemption should\nbe conveyed to man, and the fulfilment of this promise depending solely\nupon the life of Isaac, he was, nevertheless, willing that the chain of\nthese promises should be broken by the extinction of that life, because\nhis faith assured him that the Almighty would find the way to give\neffect to His own designs (Heb. xi. 17-19). The offering of Isaac is\nmentioned as a completed offering, and the intended blood-shedding, of\nwhich I shall speak presently, is not here brought into view.\n\nThe facts, however, which we have before us, and which are treated in\nScripture with caution, are grave and startling. A father is commanded\nto sacrifice his son. Before consummation, the sacrifice is interrupted.\nYet the intention of obedience had been formed, and certified by a\nseries of acts. It may have been qualified by a reserve of hope that God\nwould interpose before the final act, but of this we have no distinct\nstatement, and it can only stand as an allowable conjecture. It may be\nconceded that the narrative does not supply us with a complete statement\nof particulars. That being so, it behooves us to tread cautiously in\napproaching it. Thus much, however, I think, may further be said: the\ncommand was addressed to Abraham under conditions essentially different\nfrom those which now determine for us the limits of moral obligation.\n\nFor the conditions, both socially and otherwise, were indeed very\ndifferent. The estimate of human life at the time was different. The\nposition of the father in the family was different: its members were\nregarded as in some sense his property. There is every reason to suppose\nthat, around Abraham in \"the land of Moriah,\" the practice of human\nsacrifice as an act of religion was in vigor. But we may look more\ndeeply into the matter. According to the Book of Genesis, Adam and Eve\nwere placed under a law, not of consciously perceived right and wrong,\nbut of simple obedience. The tree, of which alone they were forbidden to\neat, was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Duty lay for them\nin following the command of the Most High, before and until they,\nor their descendants, should become capable of appreciating it by an\nethical standard. Their condition was greatly analogous to that of the\ninfant, who has just reached the stage at which he can comprehend that\nhe is ordered to do this or that, but not the nature of the thing\nso ordered. To the external standard of right and wrong, and to the\nobligation it entails per se, the child is introduced by a process\ngradually unfolded with the development of his nature, and the opening\nout of what we term a moral sense. If we pass at once from the epoch\nof Paradise to the period of the prophets, we perceive the important\nprogress that has been made in the education of the race. The Almighty,\nin His mediate intercourse with Israel, deigns to appeal to an\nindependently conceived criterion, as to an arbiter between His people\nand Himself. \"Come, now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord\"\n(Isaiah i. 18). \"Yet ye say the way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now,\nO house of Israel, is not my way equal, are not your ways unequal?\"\n(Ezekiel xvii. 25). Between these two epochs how wide a space of moral\nteaching has been traversed! But Abraham, so far as we may judge from\nthe pages of Scripture, belongs essentially to the Adamic period, far\nmore than to the prophetic. The notion of righteousness and sin was not\nindeed hidden from him: transgression itself had opened that chapter,\nand it was never to be closed: but as yet they lay wrapped up, so to\nspeak, in Divine command and prohibition. And what God commanded, it was\nfor Abraham to believe that He himself would adjust to the harmony of\nHis own character.\n\nThe faith of Abraham, with respect to this supreme trial, appears to\nhave been centered in this, that he would trust God to all extremities,\nand in despite of all appearances. The command received was obviously\ninconsistent with the promises which had preceded it. It was also\ninconsistent with the morality acknowledged in later times, and perhaps\ntoo definitely reflected in our minds, by an anachronism easy to\nconceive, on the day of Abraham. There can be little doubt, as between\nthese two points of view, that the strain upon his faith was felt\nmainly, to say the least, in connection with the first mentioned.\nThis faith is not wholly unlike the faith of Job; for Job believed, in\ndespite of what was to the eye of flesh an unrighteous government of\nthe world. If we may still trust the Authorized Version, his cry was,\n\"though he slay me, yet will I trust in him\" (Job xiii. 15). This cry\nwas, however, the expression of one who did not expect to be slain; and\nit may be that Abraham, when he said, \"My son, God will provide Himself\na lamb for a burnt offering,\" not only believed explicitly that God\nwould do what was right, but, moreover, believed implicitly that a way\nof rescue would be found for his son. I do not say that this case is\nlike the case of Jephthah, where the introduction of difficulty is only\ngratuitous. I confine myself to these propositions. Though the law\nof moral action is the same everywhere and always, it is variously\napplicable to the human being, as we know from experience, in the\nvarious stages of his development; and its first form is that of\nsimple obedience to a superior whom there is every ground to trust. And\nfurther, if the few straggling rays of our knowledge in a case of this\nkind rather exhibit a darkness lying around us than dispel it, we do\nnot even know all that was in the mind of Abraham, and are not in a\ncondition to pronounce upon it, and cannot, without departure from sound\nreason, abandon that anchorage by which he probably held, that the law\nof Nature was safe in the hands of the Author of Nature, though the\nmeans of the reconciliation between the law and the appearances have not\nbeen fully placed within our reach.\n\nBut the Reply is not entitled to so wide an answer as that which I\nhave given. In the parallel with the case of the Hindoo widow, it\nsins against first principles. An established and habitual practice\nof child-slaughter, in a country of an old and learned civilization,\npresents to us a case totally different from the issue of a command\nwhich was not designed to be obeyed and which belongs to a period when\nthe years of manhood were associated in great part with the character\nthat appertains to childhood.\n\nIt will already have been seen that the method of this Reply is not to\nargue seriously from point to point, but to set out in masses, without\nthe labor of proof, crowds of imputations, which may overwhelm an\nopponent like balls from a mitrailleuse. As the charges lightly run\nover in a line or two require pages for exhibition and confutation, an\nexhaustive answer to the Reply within the just limits of an article is\non this account out of the question; and the only proper course left\nopen seems to be to make a selection of what appears to be the favorite,\nor the most formidable and telling assertions, and to deal with these in\nthe serious way which the grave interests of the theme, not the manner\nof their presentation, may deserve.\n\nIt was an observation of Aristotle that weight attaches to the\nundemonstrated propositions of those who are able to speak on any given\nsubject matter from experience. The Reply abounds in undemonstrated\npropositions. They appear, however, to be delivered without any sense of\na necessity that either experience or reasoning are required in order\nto give them a title to acceptance. Thus, for example, the system of\nMr. Darwin is hurled against Christianity as a dart which cannot but be\nfatal (p. 475):\n\n\"His discoveries, carried to their legitimate conclusion, destroy the\ncreeds and sacred Scriptures of mankind.\"\n\nThis wide-sweeping proposition is imposed upon us with no exposition\nof the how or the why; and the whole controversy of belief one might\nsuppose is to be determined, as if from St. Petersburgh, by a series of\nukases. It is only advanced, indeed, to decorate the introduction of\nDarwin's name in support of the proposition, which I certainly should\nsupport and not contest, that error and honesty are compatible.\n\nOn what ground, then, and for what reason, is the system of Darwin fatal\nto Scriptures and to creeds? I do not enter into the question whether\nit has passed from the stage of working hypothesis into that of\ndemonstration, but I assume, for the purposes of the argument, all that,\nin this respect, the Reply can desire.\n\nIt is not possible to discover, from the random language of the Reply,\nwhether the scheme of Darwin is to sweep away all theism, or is to be\ncontent with extinguishing revealed religion. If the latter is meant, I\nshould reply that the moral history of man, in its principal stream,\nhas been distinctly an evolution from the first until now; and that the\nsuccinct though grand account of the Creation in Genesis is singularly\naccordant with the same idea, but is wider than Darwinism, since it\nincludes in the grand progression the inanimate world as well as the\nhistory of organisms. But, as this could not be shown without much\ndetail, the Reply reduces me to the necessity of following its own\nunsatisfactory example in the bald form of an assertion, that there\nis no colorable ground for assuming evolution and revelation to be at\nvariance with one another.\n\nIf, however, the meaning be that theism is swept away by Darwinism, I\nobserve that, as before, we have only an unreasoned dogma or dictum to\ndeal with, and, dealing perforce with the unknown, we are in danger of\nstriking at a will of the wisp. Still, I venture on remarking that the\ndoctrine of Evolution has acquired both praise and dispraise which\nit does not deserve. It is lauded in the skeptical camp because it is\nsupposed to get rid of the shocking idea of what are termed sudden acts\nof creation; and it is as unjustly dispraised, on the opposing side,\nbecause it is thought to bridge over the gap between man and the\ninferior animals, and to give emphasis to the relationship between them.\nBut long before the day either of Mr. Darwin or his grandfather, Dr.\nErasmus Darwin, this relationship had been stated, perhaps even more\nemphatically by one whom, were it not that I have small title to deal\nin undemonstrated assertion, I should venture to call the most cautious,\nthe most robust, and the most comprehensive of our philosophers.\nSuppose, says Bishop Butler (Analogy, Part 2, Chap. 2), that it were\nimplied in the natural immortality of brutes, that they must arrive at\ngreat attainments, and become (like us) rational and moral agents; even\nthis would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and\ncapacities they may be endowed with. And if pride causes us to deem it\nan indignity that our race should have proceeded by propagation from an\nascending scale of inferior organisms, why should it be a more repulsive\nidea to have sprung immediately from something less than man in brain\nand body, than to have been fashioned according to the expression in\nGenesis (Chap. II., v. 7), \"out of the dust of the ground?\" There are\nhalls and galleries of introduction in a palace, but none in a cottage;\nand this arrival of the creative work at its climax through an ever\naspiring preparatory series, rather than by transition at a step from\nthe inanimate mould of earth, may tend rather to magnify than to\nlower the creation of man on its physical side. But if belief has\n(as commonly) been premature in its alarms, has non-belief been more\nreflective in its exulting anticipations, and its paeans on the assumed\ndisappearance of what are strangely enough termed sudden acts of\ncreation from the sphere of our study and contemplation?\n\nOne striking effect of the Darwinian theory of descent is, so far as I\nunderstand, to reduce the breadth of all intermediate distinctions\nin the scale of animated life. It does not bring all creatures into a\nsingle lineage, but all diversities are to be traced back, at some point\nin the scale and by stages indefinitely minute, to a common ancestry.\nAll is done by steps, nothing by strides, leaps, or bounds; all from\nprotoplasm up to Shakespeare, and, again, all from primal night and\nchaos up to protoplasm. I do not ask, and am incompetent to judge,\nwhether this is among the things proven, but I take it so for the sake\nof the argument; and I ask, first, why and whereby does this doctrine\neliminate the idea of creation? Does the new philosophy teach that if\nthe passage from pure reptile to pure bird is achieved by a spring (so\nto speak) over a chasm, this implies and requires creation; but that\nif reptile passes into bird, and rudimental into finished bird, by a\nthousand slight and but just discernible modifications, each one of\nthese is so small that they are not entitled to a name so lofty, may be\nset down to any cause or no cause, as we please? I should have supposed\nit miserably unphilosophical to treat the distinction between creative\nand non-creative function as a simply quantitative distinction. As\nrespects the subjective effect on the human mind, creation in small,\nwhen closely regarded, awakens reason to admiring wonder, not less than\ncreation in great: and as regards that function itself, to me it appears\nno less than ridiculous to hold that the broadly outlined and large\nadvances of so-called Mosaism are creation, but the refined and stealthy\nonward steps of Darwinism are only manufacture, and relegate the\nquestion of a cause into obscurity, insignificance, or oblivion.\n\nBut does not reason really require us to go farther, to turn the tables\non the adversary, and to contend that evolution, by how much it binds\nmore closely together the myriad ranks of the living, aye, and of all\nother orders, by so much the more consolidates, enlarges, and enhances\nthe true argument of design, and the entire theistic position? If orders\nare not mutually related, it is easier to conceive of them as sent at\nhaphazard into the world. We may, indeed, sufficiently, draw an argument\nof design from each separate structure, but we have no further title to\nbuild upon the position which each of them holds as towards any other.\nBut when the connexion between these objects has been established, and\nso established that the points of transition are almost as indiscernible\nas the passage from day to night, then, indeed, each preceding stage is\na prophecy of the following, each succeeding one is a memorial of the\npast, and, throughout the immeasurable series, every single member of\nit is a witness to all the rest. The Reply ought surely to dispose of\nthese, and probably many more arguments in the case, before assuming\nso absolutely the rights of dictatorship, and laying it down that\nDarwinism, carried to its legitimate conclusion (and I have nowhere\nendeavored to cut short its career), destroys the creeds and Scriptures\nof mankind. That I maybe the more definite in my challenge, I would,\nwith all respect, ask the author of the Reply to set about confuting the\nsuccinct and clear argument of his countryman, Mr. Fiske, who, in the\nearlier part of the small work entitled Man's Destiny (Macmillan,\nLondon, 1887) has given what seems to me an admissible and also striking\ninterpretation of the leading Darwinian idea in its bearings on the\ntheistic argument. To this very partial treatment of a great subject I\nmust at present confine myself; and I proceed to another of the notions,\nas confident as they seem to be crude, which the Reply has drawn into\nits wide-casting net (p. 475):\n\n\"Why should God demand a sacrifice from; man? Why should the Infinite\nask anything from the finite? Should the sun beg of the glow-worm, and\nshould the momentary spark excite the envy of the source of light?\"\n\nThis is one of the cases in which happy or showy illustration is, in the\nReply before me, set to carry with a rush the position which argument\nwould have to approach more laboriously and more slowly. The case of the\nglow-worm with the sun cannot but move a reader's pity, it seems so\nvery hard. But let us suppose for a moment that the glow-worm was so\nconstituted, and so related to the sun that an interaction between them\nwas a fundamental condition of its health and life; that the glowworm\nmust, by the law of its nature, like the moon, reflect upon the sun,\naccording to its strength and measure, the light which it receives,\nand that only by a process involving that reflection its own store of\nvitality could be upheld? It will be said that this is a very large\npetitio to import into the glowworm's case. Yes, but it is the very\npetitio which is absolutely requisite in order to make it parallel to\nthe case of the Christian. The argument which the Reply has to destroy\nis and must be the Christian argument, and not some figure of straw,\nfabricated at will. It is needless, perhaps, but it is refreshing, to\nquote the noble Psalm (Ps. 1. 10, 12, 14, 15), in which this assumption\nof the Reply is rebuked. \"All the beasts of the forest are mine; and so\nare the cattle upon a thousand hills.... If I be hungry I will not tell\nthee; for the whole world is mine, and all that is therein.... Offer\nunto God thanksgiving; and pay thy vows unto the Most Highest, and call\nupon Me in the time of trouble; so will I hear thee, and thou shalt\npraise Me.\" Let me try my hand at a counter-illustration. If the Infinite\nis to make no demand upon the finite, by parity of reasoning the great\nand strong should scarcely make them on the weak and small. Why then\nshould the father make demands of love, obedience, and sacrifice, from\nhis young child? Is there not some flavor of the sun and glow-worm here?\nBut every man does so make them, if he is a man of sense and feeling;\nand he makes them for the sake and in the interest of the son himself,\nwhose nature, expanding in the warmth of affection and pious care,\nrequires, by an inward law, to return as well as to receive. And so God\nasks of us, in order that what we give to Him may be far more our own\nthan it ever was before the giving, or than it could have been unless\nfirst rendered up to Him, to become a part of what the gospel calls our\ntreasure in heaven.\n\nAlthough the Reply is not careful to supply us with whys, it does not\nhesitate to ask for them (p. 479):\n\n\"Why should an infinitely wise and powerful God destroy the good and\npreserve the vile? Why should He treat all alike here, and in another\nworld make an infinite difference? Why should your God allow His\nworshipers, His adorers, to be destroyed by His enemies? Why should He\nallow the honest, the loving, the noble, to perish at the stake?\"\n\nThe upholders of belief or of revelation, from Claudian down to Cardinal\nNewman (see the very remarkable passage of the Apologia pro vita sua,\npp. 376-78), cannot and do not, seek to deny that the methods of divine\ngovernment, as they are exhibited by experience, present to us many and\nvaried moral problems, insoluble by our understanding. Their existence\nmay not, and should not, be dissembled. But neither should they be\nexaggerated. Now exaggeration by mere suggestion is the fault, the\nglaring fault, of these queries. One who had no knowledge of mundane\naffairs beyond the conception they insinuate would assume that, as a\nrule, evil has the upper hand in the management of the world. Is this\nthe grave philosophical conclusion of a careful observer, or is it a\ncrude, hasty, and careless overstatement?\n\nIt is not difficult to conceive how, in times of sadness and of storm,\nwhen the suffering soul can discern no light at any point of the\nhorizon, place is found for such an idea of life. It is, of course,\nopposed to the Apostolic declaration that godliness hath the promise\nof the life that now is (1 Tim. iv. 8), but I am not to expect such a\ndeclaration to be accepted as current coin, even of the meanest value,\nby the author of the Reply. Yet I will offer two observations founded\non experience in support of it, one taken from a limited, another from\na larger and more open sphere. John Wesley, in the full prime of his\nmission, warned the converts whom he was making among English laborers\nof a spiritual danger that lay far ahead. It was that, becoming godly,\nthey would become careful, and, becoming careful, they would become\nwealthy. It was a just and sober forecast, and it represented with\ntruth the general rule of life, although it be a rule perplexed with\nexceptions. But, if this be too narrow a sphere of observation, let\nus take a wider one, the widest of all. It is comprised in the brief\nstatement that Christendom rules the world, and rules it, perhaps it\nshould be added, by the possession of a vast surplus of material as well\nas moral force. Therefore the assertions carried by implication in the\nqueries of the Reply, which are general, are because general untrue,\nalthough they might have been true within those prudent limitations\nwhich the method of this Reply appears especially to eschew.\n\nTaking, then, these challenges as they ought to have been given, I admit\nthat great believers, who have been also great masters of wisdom and\nknowledge, are not able to explain the inequalities of adjustment\nbetween human beings and the conditions in which they have been set down\nto work out their destiny. The climax of these inequalities is perhaps\nto be found in the fact that, whereas rational belief, viewed at large,\nfounds the Providential government of the world upon the hypothesis of\nfree agency, there are so many cases in which the overbearing mastery\nof circumstance appears to reduce it to extinction or paralysis. Now,\nin one sense, without doubt, these difficulties are matter for our\nlegitimate and necessary cognizance. It is a duty incumbent upon us\nrespectively, according to our means and opportunities, to decide for\nourselves, by the use of the faculty of reason given us, the great\nquestions of natural and revealed religion. They are to be decided\naccording to the evidence; and, if we cannot trim the evidence into a\nconsistent whole, then according to the balance of the evidence. We are\nnot entitled, either for or against belief, to set up in this province\nany rule of investigation, except such as common-sense teaches us to\nuse in the ordinary conduct of life. As in ordinary conduct, so in\nconsidering the basis of belief, we are bound to look at the evidence as\na whole. We have no right to demand demonstrative proofs, or the removal\nof all conflicting elements, either in the one sphere or in the other.\nWhat guides us sufficiently in matters of common practice has the very\nsame authority to guide us in matters of speculation; more properly,\nperhaps, to be called the practice of the soul. If the evidence in the\naggregate shows the being of a moral Governor of the world, with the\nsame force as would suffice to establish an obligation to act in a\nmatter of common conduct, we are bound in duty to accept it, and have no\nright to demand as a condition previous that all occasions of doubt or\nquestion be removed out of the way. Our demands for evidence must be\nlimited by the general reason of the case. Does that general reason of\nthe case make it probable that a finite being, with a finite place in\na comprehensive scheme, devised and administered by a Being who is\ninfinite, would be able either to embrace within his view, or rightly to\nappreciate, all the motives and the aims that may have been in the\nmind of the Divine Disposer? On the contrary, a demand so unreasonable\ndeserves to be met with the scornful challenge of Dante (Paradise xix.\n79):\n    Or tu chi sei, che vuoi sedere a scranna\n    Per giudicar da lungi mille miglia\n    Colla veduta corta d'una spanna?\n\nUndoubtedly a great deal here depends upon the question whether, and in\nwhat degree, our knowledge is limited. And here the Reply seems to be\nby no means in accord with Newton and with Butler. By its contempt for\nauthority, the Reply seems to cut off from us all knowledge that is not\nat first hand; but then also it seems to assume an original and first\nhand knowledge of all possible kinds of things. I will take an instance,\nall the easier to deal with because it is outside the immediate sphere\nof controversy. In one of those pieces of fine writing with which the\nReply abounds, it is determined obiter by a backhanded stroke (N. A.\nR., p. 491) that Shakespeare is \"by far the greatest of the human\nrace.\" I do not feel entitled to assert that he is not; but how vast and\ncomplex a question is here determined for us in this airy manner! Has\nthe writer of the Reply really weighed the force, and measured the sweep\nof his own words? Whether Shakespeare has or has not the primacy of\ngenius over a very few other names which might be placed in competition\nwith his, is a question which has not yet been determined by the general\nor deliberate judgment of lettered mankind. But behind it lies another\nquestion, inexpressibly difficult, except for the Reply, to solve. That\nquestion is, what is the relation of human genius to human greatness.\nIs genius the sole constitutive element of greatness, or with what other\nelements, and in what relations to them, is it combined? Is every man\ngreat in proportion to his genius? Was Goldsmith, or was Sheridan,\nor was Burns, or was Byron, or was Goethe, or was Napoleon, or\nwas Alcibiades, no smaller, and was Johnson, or was Howard, or was\nWashington, or was Phocion, or Leonidas, no greater, than in proportion\nto his genius properly so-called? How are we to find a common measure,\nagain, for different kinds of greatness; how weigh, for example, Dante\nagainst Julius Caesar? And I am speaking of greatness properly so\ncalled, not of goodness properly so called. We might seem to be dealing\nwith a writer whose contempt for authority in general is fully balanced,\nperhaps outweighed, by his respect for one authority in particular.\n\nThe religions of the world, again, have in many cases given to many men\nmaterial for life-long study. The study of the Christian Scriptures,\nto say nothing of Christian life and institutions, has been to many and\njustly famous men a study \"never ending, still beginning\"; not, like\nthe world of Alexander, too limited for the powerful faculty that ranged\nover it; but, on the contrary, opening height on height, and with deep\nanswering to deep, and with increase of fruit ever prescribing increase\nof effort. But the Reply has sounded all these depths, has found them\nvery shallow, and is quite able to point out (p. 490) the way in which\nthe Saviour of the world might have been a much greater teacher than\nHe actually was; had He said anything, for instance, of the family\nrelation, had He spoken against slavery and tyranny, had He issued a\nsort of code Napoleon embracing education, progress, scientific truth,\nand international law. This observation on the family relation seems to\nme beyond even the usual measure of extravagance when we bear in mind\nthat, according to the Christian scheme, the Lord of heaven and earth\n\"was subject\" (St. Luke ii. 51) to a human mother and a reputed human\nfather, and that He taught (according to the widest and, I believe, the\nbest opinion) the absolute indissolubility of marriage. I might cite\nmany other instances in reply. But the broader and the true answer to\nthe objection is, that the Gospel was promulgated to teach principles\nand not a code; that it included the foundation of a society in which\nthose principles were to be conserved, developed, and applied; and that\ndown to this day there is not a moral question of all those which\nthe Reply does or does not enumerate, nor is there a question of duty\narising in the course of life for any of us, that is not determinable\nin all its essentials by applying to it as a touchstone the principles\ndeclared in the Gospel. Is not, then, the hiatus, which the Reply has\ndiscovered in the teaching of our Lord, an imaginary hiatus? Nay, are\nthe suggested improvements of that teaching really gross deteriorations?\nWhere would have been the wisdom of delivering to an uninstructed\npopulation of a particular age a codified religion, which was to serve\nfor all nations, all ages, all states of civilization? Why was not\nroom to be left for the career of human thought in finding out, and in\nworking out, the adaptation of Christianity to the ever varying\nmovement of the world? And how is it that they who will not admit that a\nrevelation is in place when it has in view the great and necessary work\nof conflict against sin, are so free in recommending enlargements of\nthat Revelation for purposes, as to which no such necessity can be\npleaded?\n\nI have known a person who, after studying the old classical or Olympian\nreligion for the third part of a century, at length began to hope that\nhe had some partial comprehension of it, some inkling of what it meant.\nWoe is him that he was not conversant either with the faculties or with\nthe methods of the Reply, which apparently can dispose in half an hour\nof any problem, dogmatic, historical, or moral: and which accordingly\ntakes occasion to assure us that Buddha was \"in many respects the\ngreatest religious teacher this world has ever known, the broadest, the\nmost intellectual of them all\" (p. 491). On this I shall only say that\nan attempt to bring Buddha and Buddhism into line together is far beyond\nmy reach, but that every Christian, knowing in some degree what Christ\nis, and what He has done for the world, can only be the more thankful if\nBuddha, or Confucius, or any other teacher has in any point, and in\nany measure, come near to the outskirts of His ineffable greatness and\nglory.\n\nIt is my fault or my misfortune to remark, in this Reply, an inaccuracy\nof reference, which would of itself suffice to render it remarkable.\nChrist, we are told (pp. 492, 500), denounced the chosen people of God\nas \"a generation of vipers.\" This phrase is applied by the Baptist to\nthe crowd who came to seek baptism from him; but it is only applied\nby our Lord to Scribes or Pharisees (Luke iii. 7, Matthew xxiii. 33,\nand xii.34), who are so commonly placed by Him in contrast with the\npeople. The error is repeated in the mention of whited sepulchres. Take\nagain the version of the story of Ananias and Sapphira. We are told\n(p. 494) that the Apostles conceived the idea \"of having all things in\ncommon.\" In the narrative there is no statement, no suggestion of\nthe kind; it is a pure interpolation (Acts iv. 32-7). Motives of a\nreasonable prudence are stated as a mattei of fact to have influenced\nthe offending couple—another pure interpolation. After the catastrophe\nof Ananias \"the Apostles sent for his wife\"—a third interpolation. I\nrefer only to these points as exhibitions of an habitual and dangerous\ninaccuracy, and without any attempt at present to discuss the case, in\nwhich the judgments of God are exhibited on their severer side, and in\nwhich I cannot, like the Reply, undertake summarily to determine for\nwhat causes the Almighty should or should not take life, or delegate the\npower to take it.\n\nAgain, we have (p. 486) these words given as a quotation from the Bible:\n\n\"They who believe and are baptized shall be saved, and they who believe\nnot shall be damned; and these shall go away into everlasting fire,\nprepared for the devil and his angels.\"\n\nThe second clause thus reads as if applicable to the persons mentioned\nin the first; that is to say, to those who reject the tidings of the\nGospel. But instead of its being a continuous passage, the latter\nsection is brought out of another gospel (St. Matthew's) and another\nconnection; and it is really written, not of those who do not believe,\nbut those who refuse to perform offices of charity to their neighbor in\nhis need. It would be wrong to call this intentional misrepresentation;\nbut can it be called less than somewhat reckless negligence?\n\nIt is a more special misfortune to find a writer arguing on the same\nside with his critic, and yet for the critic not to be able to\nagree with him. But so it is with reference to the great subject of\nimmortality, as treated in the Reply.\n\n\"The idea of immortality, that, like a sea, has ebbed and flowed in the\nhuman heart, with its countless waves of hope and fear beating against\nthe shores and rocks of time and fate, was not born of any book, nor of\nany creed, nor of any religion. It was born of human affection; and it\nwill continue to ebb and flow beneath the mist and clouds of doubt and\ndarkness, as long as love kisses the lips of death\" (p. 483).\n\nHere we have a very interesting chapter of the history of human opinion\ndisposed of in the usual summary way, by a statement which, as it\nappears to me, is developed out of the writer's inner consciousness.\nIf the belief in immortality is not connected with any revelation\nor religion, but is simply the expression of a subjective want, then\nplainly we may expect the expression of it to be strong and clear in\nproportion to the various degrees in which faculty is developed\namong the various races of mankind. But how does the matter stand\nhistorically? The Egyptians were not a people of high intellectual\ndevelopment, and yet their religious system was strictly associated\nwith, I might rather say founded on, the belief in immortality. The\nancient Greeks, on the other hand, were a race of astonishing, perhaps\nunrivalled, intellectual capacity. But not only did they, in prehistoric\nages, derive their scheme of a future world from Egypt; we find\nalso that, with the lapse of time and the advance of the Hellenic\ncivilization, the constructive ideas of the system lost all life and\ndefinite outline, and the most powerful mind of the Greek philosophy,\nthat of Aristotle, had no clear perception whatever of a personal\nexistence in a future state.\n\nThe favorite doctrine of the Reply is the immunity of all error in\nbelief from moral responsibility. In the first page (p. 473) this is\nstated with reserve as the \"innocence of honest error.\" But why such a\nlimitation? The Reply warms with its subject; it shows us that no\nerror can be otherwise than honest, inasmuch as nothing which involves\nhonesty, or its reverse, can, from the constitution of our nature, enter\ninto the formation of opinion. Here is the full blown exposition (p.\n476):\n\n\"The brain thinks without asking our consent. We believe, or we\ndisbelieve, without an effort of the will. Belief is a result. It is the\neffect of evidence upon the mind. The scales turn in spite of him who\nwatches. _There is no opportunity of being honesty or dishonest, in\nthe formation of an opinion_. The conclusion is entirely independent of\ndesire.\"\n\nThe reasoning faculty is, therefore, wholly extrinsic to our moral\nnature, and no influence is or can be received or imparted between them.\nI know not whether the meaning is that all the faculties of our nature\nare like so many separate departments in one of the modern shops that\nsupply all human wants; that will, memory, imagination, affection,\npassion, each has its own separate domain, and that they meet only for a\ncomparison of results, just to tell one another what they have severally\nbeen doing. It is difficult to conceive, if this be so, wherein consists\nthe personality, or individuality or organic unity of man. It is not\ndifficult to see that while the Reply aims at uplifting human nature,\nit in reality plunges us (p. 475) into the abyss of degradation by the\ndestruction of moral freedom, responsibility, and unity. For we are\njustly told that \"reason is the supreme and final test.\" Action may be\nmerely instinctive and habitual, or it may be consciously founded\non formulated thought; but, in the cases where it is instinctive and\nhabitual, it passes over, so soon as it is challenged, into the other\ncategory, and finds a basis for itself in some form of opinion. But,\nsays the Reply, we have no responsibility for our opinions: we cannot\nhelp forming them according to the evidence as it presents itself to us.\nObserve, the doctrine embraces every kind of opinion, and embraces all\nalike, opinion on subjects where we like or dislike, as well as upon\nsubjects where we merely affirm or deny in some medium absolutely\ncolorless. For, if a distinction be taken between the colorless and the\ncolored medium, between conclusions to which passion or propensity or\nimagination inclines us, and conclusions to which these have nothing to\nsay, then the whole ground will be cut away from under the feet of the\nReply, and it will have to build again ab initio. Let us try this by\na test case. A father who has believed his son to have been through\nlife upright, suddenly finds that charges are made from various quarters\nagainst his integrity. Or a friend, greatly dependent for the work\nof his life on the co-operation of another friend, is told that that\ncomrade is counterworking and betraying him. I make no assumption now\nas to the evidence or the result; but I ask which of them could approach\nthe investigation without feeling a desire to be able to acquit? And\nwhat shall we say of the desire to condemn? Would Elizabeth have had\nno leaning towards finding Mary Stuart implicated in a conspiracy? Did\nEnglish judges and juries approach with an unbiassed mind the trials for\nthe Popish plot? Were the opinions formed by the English Parliament on\nthe Treaty of Limerick formed without the intervention of the will? Did\nNapoleon judge according to the evidence when he acquitted himself in\nthe matter of the Due d' Enghien? Does the intellect sit in a solitary\nchamber, like Galileo in the palace of the Vatican, and pursue celestial\nobservation all untouched, while the turmoil of earthly business is\nraging everywhere around? According to the Reply, it must be a mistake\nto suppose that there is anywhere in the world such a thing as bias, or\nprejudice, or prepossession: they are words without meaning in regard to\nour judgments, for even if they could raise a clamor from without, the\nintellect sits within, in an atmosphere of serenity, and, like Justice,\nis deaf and blind, as well as calm.\n\nIn addition to all other faults, I hold that this philosophy, or\nphantasm of philosophy, is eminently retrogressive. Human nature, in its\ncompound of flesh and spirit, becomes more complex with the progress of\ncivilization; with the steady multiplication of wants, and of means for\ntheir supply. With complication, introspection has largely extended, and\nI believe that, as observation extends its field, so far from isolating\nthe intelligence and making it autocratic, it tends more and more to\nenhance and multiply the infinitely subtle, as well as the broader and\nmore palpable modes, in which the interaction of the human faculties is\ncarried on. Who among us has not had occasion to observe, in the course\nof his experience, how largely the intellectual power of a man is\naffected by the demands of life on his moral powers, and how they open\nand grow, or dry up and dwindle, according to the manner in which those\ndemands are met.\n\nGenius itself, however purely a conception of the intellect, is not\nexempt from the strong influences of joy and suffering, love and hatred,\nhope and fear, in the development of its powers. It may be that Homer,\nShakespeare, Goethe, basking upon the whole in the sunshine of life,\ndrew little supplementary force from its trials and agitations. But\nthe history of one not less wonderful than any of these, the career of\nDante, tells a different tale; and one of the latest and most searching\ninvestigators of his history (Scartazzini, Dante Alighieri, _seine zeit,\nsein leben, und seine werkes_, B. II. Ch. 5, p. 119; also pp. 438,\n9. Biel, 1869) tells and shows us, how the experience of his life\nco-operated with his extraordinary natural gifts and capabilities to\nmake him what he was. Under the three great heads of love, belief, and\npatriotism, his life was a continued course of ecstatic or agonizing\ntrials. The strain of these trials was discipline; discipline was\nexperience; and experience was elevation. No reader of his greatest work\nwill, I believe, hold with the Reply that his thoughts, conclusions,\njudgments, were simple results of an automatic process, in which the\nwill and affections had no share, that reasoning operations are like the\nwhir of a clock running down, and we can no more arrest the process\nor alter the conclusion than the wheels can stop the movement or the\nnoise.*\n  • I possess the confession of an illiterate criminal, made,\n    I think, in 1834, under the following circumstances: The new\n    poor law had just been passed in England, and it required\n    persons needing relief to go into the workhouse as a\n    condition of receiving it. In some parts of the country,\n    this provision produced a profound popular panic. The man in\n    question was destitute at the time. He was (I think) an old\n    widower with four very young sons. He rose in the night and\n    strangled them all, one after another, with a blue\n    handkerchief, not from want of fatherly affection, but to\n    keep them out of the workhouse. The confession of this\n    peasant, simple in phrase, but intensely impassioned,\n    strongly reminds me of the Ugolino of Dante, and appears to\n    make some approach to its sublimity. Such, in given\n    circumstances, is the effect of moral agony on mental power.\n\nThe doctrine taught in the Reply, that belief is, as a general, nay,\nuniversal law, independent of the will, surely proves, when examined, to\nbe a plausibility of the shallowest kind. Even in arithmetic, if a boy,\nthrough dislike of his employment, and consequent lack of attention,\nbrings out a wrong result for his sum, it can hardly be said that his\nconclusion is absolutely and in all respects independent of his will.\nMoving onward, point by point, toward the centre of the argument, I will\nnext take an illustration from mathematics. It has (I apprehend) been\ndemonstrated that the relation of the diameter to the circumference of\na circle is not susceptible of full numerical expression. Yet, from time\nto time, treatises are published which boldly announce that they set\nforth the quadrature of the circle. I do not deny that this may be\npurely intellectual error; but would it not, on the other hand, be\nhazardous to assert that no grain of egotism or ambition has ever\nentered into the composition of any one of such treatises? I have\nselected these instances as, perhaps, the most favorable that can be\nfound to the doctrine of the Reply. But the truth is that, if we\nset aside matters of trivial import, the enormous majority of human\njudgments are those into which the biassing power off likes and dislikes\nmore or less largely enters. I admit, indeed, that the illative faculty\nworks under rules upon which choice and inclination ought to exercise no\ninfluence whatever. But even if it were granted that in fact the\nfaculty of discourse is exempted from all such influence within its own\nprovince, yet we come no nearer to the mark, because that faculty has\nto work upon materials supplied to it by other faculties; it draws\nconclusions according to premises, and the question has to be determined\nwhether our conceptions set forth in those premises are or are not\ninfluenced by moral causes. For, if they be so influenced, then in vain\nwill be the proof that the understanding has dealt loyally and exactly\nwith the materials it had to work upon; inasmuch as, although the\nintellectual process be normal in itself, the operation may have been\ntainted ab initio by coloring and distorting influences which have\nfalsified the primary conceptions.\n\nLet me now take an illustration from the extreme opposite quarter to\nthat which I first drew upon. The system called Thuggism, represented\nin the practice of the Thugs, taught that the act, which we describe\nas murder, was innocent. Was this an honest error? Was it due, in its\nauthors as well as in those who blindly followed them, to an automatic\nprocess of thought, in which the will was not consulted, and which\naccordingly could entail no responsibility? If it was, then it is plain\nthat the whole foundations, not of belief, but of social morality, are\nbroken up. If it was not, then the sweeping doctrine of the present\nwriter on the necessary blamelessness of erroneous conclusions tumbles\nto the ground like a house of cards at the breath of the child who built\nit.\n\nIn truth, the pages of the Reply, and the Letter which has more recently\nfollowed it,* themselves demonstrate that what the writer has asserted\nwholesale he overthrows and denies in detail.\n  • North American Review for January, 1888, \"Another Letter\n    to Dr. Field.\"\n\n\"You will admit,\" says the Reply (p. 477), \"that he who now persecutes\nfor opinion's sake is infamous.\" But why? Suppose he thinks that by\npersecution he can bring a man from soul-destroying falsehood to\nsoul-saving truth, this opinion may reflect on his intellectual\ndebility: but that is his misfortune, not his fault. His brain has\nthought without asking his consent; he has believed or disbelieved\nwithout an effort of the will (p. 476). Yet the very writer, who has\nthus established his title to think, is the first to hurl at him an\nanathema for thinking. And again, in the Letter to Dr. Field (N. A. R.,\nvol. 146, p. 33), \"the dogma of eternal pain\" is described as \"that\ninfamy of infamies.\" I am not about to discuss the subject of future\nretribution. If I were, it would be my first duty to show that this\nwriter has not adequately considered either the scope of his own\narguments (which in no way solve the difficulties he presents) or the\nmeaning of his words; and my second would be to recommend his perusal of\nwhat Bishop Butler has suggested on this head. But I am at present on\nground altogether different. I am trying another issue. This author says\nwe believe or disbelieve without the action of the will, and,\nconsequently, belief or disbelief is not the proper subject of praise or\nblame. And yet, according to the very same authority, the dogma of\neternal pain is what?—not \"an error of errors,\" but an \"infamy of\ninfamies;\" and though to hold a negative may not be a subject of moral\nreproach, yet to hold the affirmative may. Truly it may be asked, is not\nthis a fountain which sends forth at once sweet waters and bitter?\n\nOnce more. I will pass away from tender ground, and will endeavor to\nlodge a broader appeal to the enlightened judgment of the author. Says\nOdysseus in the Illiad (B. II.) [—Greek—]: and a large part of the\nworld, stretching this sentiment beyond its original meaning, have held\nthat the root of civil power is not in the community, but in its head.\nIn opposition to this doctrine, the American written Constitution, and\nthe entire American tradition, teach the right of a nation to\nself-government. And these propositions, which have divided and still\ndivide the world, open out respectively into vast systems of\nirreconcilable ideas and laws, practices and habits of mind. Will any\nrational man, above all will any American, contend that these\nconflicting systems have been adopted, upheld, and enforced on one side\nand the other, in the daylight of pure reasoning only, and that moral,\nor immoral, causes have had nothing to do with their adoption? That the\nintellect has worked impartially, like a steam-engine, and that\nselfishness, love of fame, love of money, love of power, envy, wrath,\nand malice, or again bias, in its least noxious form, have never had\nanything to do with generating the opposing movements, or the frightful\ncollisions in which they have resulted? If we say that they have not, we\ncontradict the universal judgment of mankind. If we say they have, then\nmental processes are not automatic, but may be influenced by the will\nand by the passions, affections, habits, fancies that sway the will; and\nthis writer will not have advanced a step toward proving the universal\ninnocence of error, until he has shown that propositions of religion are\nessentially unlike almost all other propositions, and that no man ever\nhas been, or from the nature of the case can be, affected in their\nacceptance or rejection by moral causes.*\n  • The chief part of these observations were written before I\n    had received the January number of the Review, with Col.\n    Ingersoll's additional letter to Dr. Field. Much, of this\n    letter is specially pointed at Dr. Field, who can defend\n    himself, and at Calvin, whose ideas I certainly cannot\n    undertake to defend all along the line. I do not see that\n    the Letter adds to those, the most salient, points of the\n    earlier article which I have endeavored to select for\n    animadversion.\n\nTo sum up. There are many passages in these noteworthy papers, which,\ntaken by themselves, are calculated to command warm sympathy. Towards\nthe close of his final, or latest letter, the writer expresses himself\nas follows (N. A. R., vol. 146, p. 46.):\n\n\"Neither in the interest of truth, nor for the benefit of man, is it\nnecessary to assert what we do not know. No cause is great enough to\ndemand a sacrifice of candor. The mysteries of life and death, of good\nand evil, have never yet been solved.\" How good, how wise are these\nwords! But coming at the close of the controversy, have they not some of\nthe ineffectual features of a death-bed repentance? They can hardly\nbe said to represent in all points the rules under which the pages\npreceding them have been composed; or he, who so justly says that we\nought not to assert what we do not know, could hardly have laid down\nthe law as we find it a few pages earlier (ibid, p. 40) when it is\npronounced that \"an infinite God has no excuse for leaving his children\nin doubt and darkness.\" Candor and upright intention are indeed every\nwhere manifest amidst the flashing corruscations which really compose\nthe staple of the articles. Candor and upright intention also impose\nupon a commentator the duty of formulating his animadversions. I sum\nthem up under two heads. Whereas we are placed in an atmosphere of\nmystery, relieved only by a little sphere of light round each of us,\nlike a clearing in an American forest (which this writer has so well\ndescribed), and rarely can see farther than is necessary for the\ndirection of our own conduct from day to day, we find here, assumed by\na particular person, the character of an universal judge without appeal.\nAnd whereas the highest self-restraint is necessary in these dark but,\ntherefore, all the more exciting inquiries, in order to maintain the\never quivering balance of our faculties, this rider chooses to ride an\nunbroken horse, and to throw the reins upon his neck. I have endeavored\nto give a sample of the results.\n\nW. E. Gladstone.\n\nCol. Ingersoll to Mr. Gladstone\n\nTo The Right Honorable W. E. Gladstone, M. P.:\n\nMy Dear Sir:\n\nAt the threshold of this Reply, it gives me pleasure to say that for\nyour intellect and character I have the greatest respect; and let me\nsay further, that I shall consider your arguments, assertions, and\ninferences entirely apart from your personality—apart from the exalted\nposition that you occupy in the estimation of the civilized world. I\ngladly acknowledge the inestimable services that you have rendered, not\nonly to England, but to mankind. Most men are chilled and narrowed by\nthe snows of age; their thoughts are darkened by the approach of night.\nBut you, for many years, have hastened toward the light, and your mind\nhas been \"an autumn that grew the more by reaping.\"\n\nUnder no circumstances could I feel justified in taking advantage of the\nadmissions that you have made as to the \"errors\" the \"misfeasance\" the\n\"infirmities and the perversity\" of the Christian Church.\n\nIt is perfectly apparent that churches, being only aggregations of\npeople, contain the prejudice, the ignorance, the vices and the\nvirtues of ordinary human beings. The perfect cannot be made out of the\nimperfect.\n\nA man is not necessarily a great mathematician because he admits the\ncorrectness of the multiplication table. The best creed may be believed\nby the worst of the human race. Neither the crimes nor the virtues\nof the church tend to prove or disprove the supernatural origin of\nreligion. The massacre of St. Bartholomew tends no more to establish the\ninspiration of the Scriptures, than the bombardment of Alexandria.\n\nBut there is one thing that cannot be admitted, and that is your\nstatement that the constitution of man is in a \"warped, impaired, and\ndislocated condition,\" and that \"these deformities indispose men to\nbelief.\" Let us examine this.\n\nWe say that a thing is \"warped\" that was once nearer level, flat, or\nstraight; that it is \"impaired\" when it was once nearer perfect, and\nthat it is \"dislocated\" when once it was united. Consequently, you have\nsaid that at some time the human constitution was unwarped, unimpaired,\nand with each part working in harmony with all. You seem to believe\nin the degeneracy of man, and that our unfortunate race, starting at\nperfection, has traveled downward through all the wasted years.\n\nIt is hardly possible that our ancestors were perfect. If history proves\nanything, it establishes the fact that civilization was not first, and\nsavagery afterwards. Certainly the tendency of man is not now toward\nbarbarism. There must have been a time when language was unknown,\nwhen lips had never formed a word. That which man knows, man must have\nlearned. The victories of our race have been slowly and painfully won.\nIt is a long distance from the gibberish of the savage to the sonnets\nof Shakespeare—a long and weary road from the pipe of Pan to the great\norchestra voiced with every tone from the glad warble of a mated bird\nto the hoarse thunder of the sea. The road is long that lies between the\ndiscordant cries uttered by the barbarian over the gashed body of\nhis foe and the marvelous music of Wagner and Beethoven. It is hardly\npossible to conceive of the years that lie between the caves in which\ncrouched our naked ancestors crunching the bones of wild beasts, and the\nhome of a civilized man with its comforts, its articles of luxury and\nuse,—with its works of art, with its enriched and illuminated walls.\nThink of the billowed years that must have rolled between these shores.\nThink of the vast distance that man has slowly groped from the dark dens\nand lairs of ignorance and fear to the intellectual conquests of our\nday.\n\nIs it true that these deformities, these warped, impaired, and\ndislocated constitutions indispose men to belief? Can we in this\nway account for the doubts entertained by the intellectual leaders of\nmankind?\n\nIt will not do, in this age and time, to account for unbelief in this\ndeformed and dislocated way. The exact opposite must be true. Ignorance\nand credulity sustain the relation of cause and effect. Ignorance is\nsatisfied with assertion, with appearance. As man rises in the scale of\nintelligence he demands evidence. He begins to look back of appearance.\nHe asks the priest for reasons. The most ignorant part of Christendom is\nthe most orthodox.\n\nYou have simply repeated a favorite assertion of the clergy, to the\neffect that man rejects the gospel because he is naturally depraved and\nhard of heart—because, owing to the sin of Adam and Eve, he has fallen\nfrom the perfection and purity of Paradise to that \"impaired\" condition\nin which he is satisfied with the filthy rags of reason, observation and\nexperience.\n\nThe truth is, that what you call unbelief is only a higher and holier\nfaith. Millions of men reject Christianity because of its cruelty. The\nBible was never rejected by the cruel. It has been upheld by countless\ntyrants—by the dealers in human flesh—by the destroyers of nations—by\nthe enemies of intelligence—by the stealers of babes and the whippers\nof women.\n\nIt is also true that it has been held as sacred by the good, the\nself-denying, the virtuous and the loving, who clung to the sacred\nvolume on account of the good it contains and in spite of all its\ncruelties and crimes.\n\nYou are mistaken when you say that all \"the faults of all the Christian\nbodies and subdivisions of bodies have been carefully raked together,\"\nin my Reply to Dr. Field, \"and made part and parcel of the indictment\nagainst the divine scheme of salvation.\"\n\nNo thoughtful man pretends that any fault of any Christian body can\nbe used as an argument against what you call the \"divine scheme of\nredemption.\"\n\nI find in your Remarks the frequent charge that I am guilty of making\nassertions and leaving them to stand without the assistance of argument\nor fact, and it may be proper, at this particular point, to inquire how\nyou know that there is \"a divine scheme of redemption.\"\n\nMy objections to this \"divine scheme of redemption\" are: first, that\nthere is not the slightest evidence that it is divine; second, that\nit is not in any sense a \"scheme,\" human or divine; and third, that it\ncannot, by any possibility, result in the redemption of a human being.\n\nIt cannot be divine, because it has no foundation in the nature of\nthings, and is not in accordance with reason. It is based on the idea\nthat right and wrong are the expression of an arbitrary will, and not\nwords applied to and descriptive of acts in the light of consequences.\nIt rests upon the absurdity called \"pardon,\" upon the assumption that\nwhen a crime has been committed justice will be satisfied with the\npunishment of the innocent. One person may suffer, or reap a benefit, in\nconsequence of the act of another, but no man can be justly punished for\nthe crime, or justly rewarded for the virtues, of another. A \"scheme\"\nthat punishes an innocent man for the vices of another can hardly be\ncalled divine. Can a murderer find justification in the agonies of his\nvictim? There is no vicarious vice; there is no vicarious virtue. For me\nit is hard to understand how a just and loving being can charge one of\nhis children with the vices, or credit him with the virtues, of another.\n\nAnd why should we call anything a \"divine scheme\" that has been a\nfailure from the \"fall of man\" until the present moment? What race, what\nnation, has been redeemed through the instrumentality of this \"divine\nscheme\"? Have not the subjects of redemption been for the most part the\nenemies of civilization? Has not almost every valuable book since the\ninvention of printing been denounced by the believers in the \"divine\nscheme\"? Intelligence, the development of the mind, the discoveries of\nscience, the inventions of genius, the cultivation of the imagination\nthrough art and music, and the practice of virtue will redeem the human\nrace. These are the saviors of mankind.\n\nYou admit that the \"Christian churches have by their exaggerations and\nshortcomings, and by their faults of conduct, contributed to bring about\na condition of hostility to religious faith.\"\n\nIf one wishes to know the worst that man has done, all that power guided\nby cruelty can do, all the excuses that can be framed for the commission\nof every crime, the infinite difference that can exist between that\nwhich is professed and that which is practiced, the marvelous malignity\nof meekness, the arrogance of humility and the savagery of what is known\nas \"universal love,\" let him read the history of the Christian Church.\n\nYet, I not only admit that millions of Christians have been honest in\nthe expression of their opinions, but that they have been among the best\nand noblest of our race.\n\nAnd it is further admitted that a creed should be examined apart from\nthe conduct of those who have assented to its truth. The church should\nbe judged as a whole, and its faults should be accounted for either by\nthe weakness of human nature, or by reason of some defect or vice in the\nreligion taught,—or by both.\n\nIs there anything in the Christian religion—anything in what you are\npleased to call the \"Sacred Scriptures\" tending to cause the crimes and\natrocities that have been committed by the church?\n\nIt seems to be natural for man to defend himself and the ones he loves.\nThe father slays the man who would kill his child—he defends the body.\nThe Christian father burns the heretic—he defends the soul.\n\nIf \"orthodox Christianity\" be true, an infidel has not the right to\nlive. Every book in which the Bible is attacked should be burned with\nits author. Why hesitate to burn a man whose constitution is \"warped,\nimpaired and dislocated,\" for a few moments, when hundreds of others\nwill be saved from eternal flames?\n\nIn Christianity you will find the cause of persecution. The idea\nthat belief is essential to salvation—this ignorant and merciless\ndogma—accounts for the atrocities of the church. This absurd\ndeclaration built the dungeons, used the instruments of torture, erected\nthe scaffolds and lighted the fagots of a thousand years.\n\nWhat, I pray you, is the \"heavenly treasure\" in the keeping of your\nchurch? Is it a belief in an infinite God? That was believed thousands\nof years before the serpent tempted Eve. Is it the belief in the\nimmortality of the soul? That is far older. Is it that man should treat\nhis neighbor as himself? That is more ancient. What is the treasure in\nthe keeping of the church? Let me tell you. It is this: That there is\nbut one true religion—Christianity,—and that all others are false;\nthat the prophets, and Christs, and priests of all others have been and\nare impostors, or the victims of insanity; that the Bible is the one\ninspired book—the one authentic record of the words of God; that all\nmen are naturally depraved and deserve to be punished with unspeakable\ntorments forever; that there is only one path that leads to heaven,\nwhile countless highways lead to hell; that there is only one name under\nheaven by which a human being can be saved; that we must believe in\nthe Lord Jesus Christ; that this life, with its few and fleeting years,\nfixes the fate of man; that the few will be saved and the many forever\nlost. This is \"the heavenly treasure\" within the keeping of your church.\n\nAnd this \"treasure\" has been guarded by the cherubim of persecution,\nwhose flaming swords were wet for many centuries with the best and\nbravest blood. It has been guarded by cunning, by hypocrisy, by\nmendacity, by honesty, by calumniating the generous, by maligning the\ngood, by thumbscrews and racks, by charity and love, by robbery and\nassassination, by poison and fire, by the virtues of the ignorant and\nthe vices of the learned, by the violence of mobs and the whirlwinds of\nwar, by every hope and every fear, by every cruelty and every crime, and\nby all there is of the wild beast in the heart of man.\n\nWith great propriety it may be asked: In the keeping of which church is\nthis \"heavenly treasure\"? Did the Catholics have it, and was it taken\nby Luther? Did Henry the VIII. seize it, and is it now in the keeping\nof the Church of England? Which of the warring sects in America has this\ntreasure; or have we, in this country, only the \"rust and cankers\"? Is\nit in an Episcopal Church, that refuses to associate with a colored\nman for whom Christ died, and who is good enough for the society of the\nangelic host?\n\nBut wherever this \"heavenly treasure\" has been, about it have always\nhovered the Stymphalian birds of superstition, thrusting their brazen\nbeaks and claws deep into the flesh of honest men.\n\nYou were pleased to point out as the particular line justifying your\nassertion \"that denunciation, sarcasm, and invective constitute the\nstaple of my work,\" that line in which I speak of those who expect to\nreceive as alms an eternity of joy, and add: \"I take this as a specimen\nof the mode of statement which permeates the whole.\"\n\nDr. Field commenced his Open Letter by saying: \"I am glad that I know\nyou, _even though some of my brethren look upon you as a monster,\nbecause of your unbelief_.\"\n\nIn reply I simply said: \"The statement in your Letter that some of your\nbrethren look upon me as a monster on account of my unbelief tends\nto show that those who love God are not always the friends of their\nfellow-men. Is it not strange that people who admit that they ought to\nbe eternally damned—that they are by nature depraved—that there is no\nsoundness or health in them, can be so arrogantly egotistic as to look\nupon others as monsters? And yet some of your brethren, who regard\nunbelievers as infamous, rely for salvation entirely on the goodness of\nanother, and expect to receive as alms an eternity of joy.\" Is there any\ndenunciation, sarcasm or invective in this?\n\nWhy should one who admits that he himself is totally depraved call\nany other man, by way of reproach, a monster? Possibly, he might be\njustified in addressing him as a fellow-monster.\n\nI am not satisfied with your statement that \"the Christian receives as\nalms all whatsoever he receives at all.\" Is it true that man deserves\nonly punishment? Does the man who makes the world better, who works and\nbattles for the right, and dies for the good of his fellow-men, deserve\nnothing but pain and anguish? Is happiness a gift or a consequence? Is\nheaven only a well-conducted poorhouse? Are the angels in their highest\nestate nothing but happy paupers? Must all the redeemed feel that they\nare in heaven simply because there was a miscarriage of justice? Will\nthe lost be the only ones who will know that the right thing has been\ndone, and will they alone appreciate the \"ethical elements of religion\"?\nWill they repeat the words that you have quoted: \"Mercy and judgment are\nmet together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other\"? or will\nthose words be spoken by the redeemed as they joyously contemplate the\nwrithings of the lost?\n\nNo one will dispute \"that in the discussion of important questions\ncalmness and sobriety are essential.\" But solemnity need not be carried\nto the verge of mental paralysis. In the search for truth,—that\neverything in nature seems to hide,—man needs the assistance of all his\nfaculties. All the senses should be awake. Humor should carry a torch,\nWit should give its sudden light, Candor should hold the scales, Reason,\nthe final arbiter, should put his royal stamp on every fact, and Memory,\nwith a miser's care, should keep and guard the mental gold.\n\nThe church has always despised the man of humor, hated laughter, and\nencouraged the lethargy of solemnity. It is not willing that the mind\nshould subject its creed to every test of truth. It wishes to overawe.\nIt does not say, \"He that hath a mind to think, let him think;\" but, \"He\nthat hath ears to hear, let him hear.\" The church has always abhorred\nwit,—that is to say, it does not enjoy being struck by the lightning\nof the soul. The foundation of wit is logic, and it has always been the\nenemy of the supernatural, the solemn and absurd.\n\nYou express great regret that no one at the present day is able to\nwrite like Pascal. You admire his wit and tenderness, and the unique,\nbrilliant, and fascinating manner in which he treated the profoundest\nand most complex themes. Sharing in your admiration and regret, I\ncall your attention to what might be called one of his religious\ngeneralizations: \"Disease is the natural state of a Christian.\"\nCertainly it cannot be said that I have ever mingled the profound and\ncomplex in a more fascinating manner.\n\nAnother instance is given of the \"tumultuous method in which I conduct,\nnot, indeed, my argument, but my case.\"\n\nDr. Field had drawn a distinction between superstition and religion, to\nwhich I replied: \"You are shocked at the Hindoo mother when she gives\nher child to death at the supposed command of her God. What do you think\nof Abraham, of Jephthah? What is your opinion of Jehovah himself?\"\n\nThese simple questions seem to have excited you to an unusual degree,\nand you ask in words of some severity:\n\n\"Whether this is the tone in which controversies ought be carried on?\"\nAnd you say that—\"not only is the name of Jehovah encircled in the\nheart of every believer with the pro-foundest reverence and love, but\nthat the Christian religion teaches, through the incarnation, a personal\nrelation with God so lofty that it can only be approached in a deep,\nreverential calm.\" You admit that \"a person who deems a given religion\nto be wicked, may be led onward by logical consistency to impugn in\nstrong terms the character of the author and object of that religion,\"\nbut you insist that such person is \"bound by the laws of social morality\nand decency to consider well the terms and meaning of his indictment.\"\n\nWas there any lack of \"reverential calm\" in my question? I gave no\nopinion, drew no indictment, but simply asked for the opinion of\nanother. Was that a violation of the \"laws of social morality and\ndecency\"?\n\nIt is not necessary for me to discuss this question with you. It has\nbeen settled by Jehovah himself. You probably remember the account given\nin the eighteenth chapter of I. Kings, of a contest between the prophets\nof Baal and the prophets of Jehovah. There were four hundred and fifty\nprophets of the false God who endeavored to induce their deity to\nconsume with fire from heaven the sacrifice upon his altar. According\nto the account, they were greatly in earnest. They certainly appeared to\nhave some hope of success, but the fire did not descend.\n\n\"And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked them and said 'Cry\naloud, for he is a god; either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he\nis in a journey, or peradventure, he sleepeth and must be awaked.'\"\n\nDo you consider that the proper way to attack the God of another? Did\nnot Elijah know that the name of Baal \"was encircled in the heart of\nevery believer with the profoundest reverence and love\"? Did he \"violate\nthe laws of social morality and decency\"?\n\nBut Jehovah and Elijah did not stop at this point. They were not\nsatisfied with mocking the prophets of Baal, but they brought them down\nto the brook Kishon—four hundred and fifty of them—and there they\nmurdered every one.\n\nDoes it appear to you that on that occasion, on the banks of the brook\nKishon—\"Mercy and judgment met together, and that righteousness and\npeace kissed each other\"?\n\nThe question arises: Has every one who reads the Old Testament the right\nto express his thought as to the character of Jehovah? You will admit\nthat as he reads his mind will receive some impression, and that when\nhe finishes the \"inspired volume\" he will have some opinion as to the\ncharacter of Jehovah. Has he the right to express that opinion? Is the\nBible a revelation from God to man? Is it a revelation to the man who\nreads it, or to the man who does not read it? If to the man who reads\nit, has he the right to give to others the revelation that God has given\nto him? If he comes to the conclusion at which you have arrived,—that\nJehovah is God,—has he the right to express that opinion?\n\nIf he concludes, as I have done, that Jehovah is a myth, must he refrain\nfrom giving his honest thought? Christians do not hesitate to give their\nopinion of heretics, philosophers, and infidels. They are not restrained\nby the \"laws of social morality and decency.\" They have persecuted to\nthe extent of their power, and their Jehovah pronounced upon unbelievers\nevery curse capable of being expressed in the Hebrew dialect. At this\nmoment, thousands of missionaries are attacking the gods of the heathen\nworld, and heaping contempt on the religion of others.\n\nBut as you have seen proper to defend Jehovah, let us for a moment\nexamine this deity of the ancient Jews.\n\nThere are several tests of character. It may be that all the virtues can\nbe expressed in the word \"kindness,\" and that nearly all the vices are\ngathered together in the word \"cruelty.\"\n\nLaughter is a test of character. When we know what a man laughs at,\nwe know what he really is. Does he laugh at misfortune, at poverty,\nat honesty in rags, at industry without food, at the agonies of his\nfellow-men? Does he laugh when he sees the convict clothed in the\ngarments of shame—at the criminal on the scaffold? Does he rub his\nhands with glee over the embers of an enemy's home? Think of a man\ncapable ol laughing while looking at Marguerite in the prison cell with\nher dead babe by her side. What must be the real character of a God who\nlaughs at the calamities of his children, mocks at their fears, their\ndesolation, their distress and anguish? Would an infinitely loving God\nhold his ignorant children in derision? Would he pity, or mock? Save, or\ndestroy? Educate, or exterminate? Would he lead them with gentle hands\ntoward the light, or lie in wait for them like a wild beast? Think of\nthe echoes of Jehovah's laughter in the rayless caverns of the eternal\nprison. Can a good man mock at the children of deformity? Will he deride\nthe misshapen? Your Jehovah deformed some of his own children, and then\nheld them up to scorn and hatred. These divine mistakes—these blunders\nof the infinite—were not allowed to enter the temple erected in honor\nof him who had dishonored them. Does a kind father mock his deformed\nchild? What would you think of a mother who would deride and taunt her\nmisshapen babe?\n\nThere is another test. How does a man use power? Is he gentle or cruel?\nDoes he defend the weak, succor the oppressed, or trample on the fallen?\n\nIf you will read again the twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy, you\nwill find how Jehovah, the compassionate, whose name is enshrined in so\nmany hearts, threatened to use his power.\n\n\"The Lord shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and\nwith an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with the sword,\nand with blasting and mildew. And thy heaven that is over thy head shall\nbe brass, and the earth that is under thee shall be iron. The Lord shall\nmake the rain of thy land powder and dust.\".... \"And thy carcass shall\nbe meat unto all fowls of the air and unto the beasts of the earth.\"....\n\"The Lord shall smite thee with madness and blindness. And thou shalt\neat of the fruit of thine own body, the flesh of thy sons and thy\ndaughters. The tender and delicate woman among you,... her eye shall be\nevil... toward her young one and toward her children which she shall\nbear; for she shall eat them.\"\n\nShould it be found that these curses were in fact uttered by the God of\nhell, and that the translators had made a mistake in attributing them\nto Jehovah, could you say that the sentiments expressed are inconsistent\nwith the supposed character of the Infinite Fiend?\n\nA nation is judged by its laws—by the punishment it inflicts. The\nnation that punishes ordinary offences with death is regarded as\nbarbarous, and the nation that tortures before it kills is denounced as\nsavage.\n\nWhat can you say of the government of Jehovah, in which death was the\npenalty for hundreds of offences?—death for the expression of an honest\nthought—death for touching with a good intention a sacred ark—death\nfor making hair oil—for eating shew bread—for imitating incense and\nperfumery?\n\nIn the history of the world a more cruel code cannot be found. Crimes\nseem to have been invented to gratify a fiendish desire to shed the\nblood of men.\n\nThere is another test: How does a man treat the animals in his\npower—his faithful horse—his patient ox—his loving dog?\n\nHow did Jehovah treat the animals in Egypt? Would a loving God, with\nfierce hail from heaven, bruise and kill the innocent cattle for the\ncrimes of their owners? Would he torment, torture and destroy them for\nthe sins of men?\n\nJehovah was a God of blood. His altar was adorned with the horns of\na beast. He established a religion in which every temple was a\nslaughter-house, and every priest a butcher—a religion that demanded\nthe death of the first-born, and delighted in the destruction of life.\n\nThere is still another test: The civilized man gives to others the\nrights that he claims for himself. He believes in the liberty of thought\nand expression, and abhors persecution for conscience sake.\n\nDid Jehovah believe in the innocence of thought and the liberty of\nexpression? Kindness is found with true greatness. Tyranny lodges only\nin the breast of the small, the narrow, the shriveled and the selfish.\nDid Jehovah teach and practice generosity? Was he a believer in\nreligious liberty? If he was and is, in fact, God, he must have known,\neven four thousand years ago, that worship must be free, and that he who\nis forced upon his knees cannot, by any possibility, have the spirit of\nprayer.\n\nLet me call your attention to a few passages in the thirteenth chapter\nof Deuteronomy:\n\n\"If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or\nthe wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice\nthee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods,... thou shalt\nnot consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity\nhim, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him; but thou\nshalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to\ndeath, and afterwards the hand of all the people. And thou shalt stone\nhim with stones, that he die.\"\n\nIs it possible for you to find in the literature of this world more\nawful passages than these? Did ever savagery, with strange and uncouth\nmarks, with awkward forms of beast and bird, pollute the dripping walls\nof caves with such commands? Are these the words of infinite mercy? When\nthey were uttered, did \"righteousness and peace kiss each other\"? How\ncan any loving man or woman \"encircle the name of Jehovah\"—author of\nthese words—\"with profoundest reverence and love\"? Do I rebel because\nmy \"constitution is warped, impaired and dislocated\"? Is it because of\n\"total depravity\" that I denounce the brutality of Jehovah? If my heart\nwere only good—if I loved my neighbor as myself—would I then see\ninfinite mercy in these hideous words? Do I lack \"reverential calm\"?\n\nThese frightful passages, like coiled adders, were in the hearts of\nJehovah's chosen people when they crucified \"the Sinless Man.\"\n\nJehovah did not tell the husband to reason with his wife. She was to\nbe answered only with death. She was to be bruised and mangled to a\nbleeding, shapeless mass of quivering flesh, for having breathed an\nhonest thought.\n\nIf there is anything of importance in this world, it is the family, the\nhome, the marriage of true souls, the equality of husband and wife—the\ntrue republicanism of the heart—the real democracy of the fireside.\n\nLet us read the sixteenth verse of the third chapter of Genesis:\n\n\"Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy\nconception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire\nshall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.\"\n\nNever will I worship any being who added to the sorrows and agonies of\nmaternity. Never will I bow to any God who introduced slavery into every\nhome—who made the wife a slave and the husband a tyrant.\n\nThe Old Testament shows that Jehovah, like his creators, held women\nin contempt. They were regarded as property: \"Thou shalt not covet thy\nneighbor's wife,—nor his ox.\"\n\nWhy should a pure woman worship a God who upheld polygamy? Let us finish\nthis subject: The institution of slavery involves all crimes. Jehovah\nwas a believer in slavery. This is enough. Why should any civilized man\nworship him? Why should his name \"be encircled with love and tenderness\nin any human heart\"?\n\nHe believed that man could become the property of man—that it was right\nfor his chosen people to deal in human flesh—to buy and sell mothers\nand babes. He taught that the captives were the property of the captors\nand directed his chosen people to kill, to enslave, or to pollute.\n\nIn the presence of these commandments, what becomes of the fine\nsaying, \"Love thy neighbor as thyself\"? What shall we say of a God who\nestablished slavery, and then had the effrontery to say, \"Thou shalt not\nsteal\"?\n\nIt may be insisted that Jehovah is the Father of all—and that he\nhas \"made of one blood all the nations of the earth.\" How then can we\naccount for the wars of extermination? Does not the commandment \"Love\nthy neighbor as thyself,\" apply to nations precisely the same as to\nindividuals? Nations, like individuals, become great by the practice of\nvirtue. How did Jehovah command his people to treat their neighbors?\n\nHe commanded his generals to destroy all, men, women and babes: \"Thou\nshalt save nothing alive that breatheth.\"\n\n\"I will make mine arrows drunk with blood, and my sword shall devour\nflesh.\"\n\n\"That thy foot may be dipped in the blood of thine enemies, and the\ntongue of thy dogs in the same.\"\n\n\"... I will also send the teeth of beasts upon them, with the poison of\nserpents of the dust....\"\n\n\"The sword without and terror within shall destroy both the young man\nand the virgin, the suckling also, with the man of gray hairs.\"\n\nIs it possible that these words fell from the lips of the Most Merciful?\n\nYou may reply that the inhabitants of Canaan were unfit to live—that\nthey were ignorant and cruel. Why did not Jehovah, the \"Father of all,\"\ngive them the Ten Commandments? Why did he leave them without a bible,\nwithout prophets and priests? Why did he shower all the blessings of\nrevelation on one poor and wretched tribe, and leave the great world\nin ignorance and crime—and why did he order his favorite children to\nmurder those whom he had neglected?\n\nBy the question I asked of Dr. Field, the intention was to show that\nJephthah, when he sacrificed his daughter to Jehovah, was as much the\nslave of superstition as is the Hindoo mother when she throws her babe\ninto the yellow waves of the Ganges.\n\nIt seems that this savage Jephthah was in direct communication with\nJehovah at Mizpeh, and that he made a vow unto the Lord and said:\n\n\"If thou shalt without fail deliver the children of Ammon into mine\nhands, then it shall be that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of\nmy house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon,\nshall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up as a burnt offering.\"\n\nIn the first place, it is perfectly clear that the sacrifice intended\nwas a human sacrifice, from the words: \"that whatsoever cometh forth\nof the doors of my house to meet me.\" Some human being—wife,\ndaughter, friend, was expected to come. According to the account, his\ndaughter—his only daughter—his only child—came first.\n\nIf Jephthah was in communication with God, why did God allow this man\nto make this vow; and why did he allow the daughter that he loved to be\nfirst, and why did he keep silent and allow the vow to be kept, while\nflames devoured the daughter's flesh?\n\nSt. Paul is not authority. He praises Samuel, the man who hewed Agag in\npieces; David, who compelled hundreds to pass under the saws and\nharrows of death, and many others who shed the blood of the innocent and\nhelpless. Paul is an unsafe guide. He who commends the brutalities of\nthe past, sows the seeds of future crimes.\n\nIf \"believers are not obliged to approve of the conduct of Jephthah\"\nare they free to condemn the conduct of Jehovah? If you will read the\naccount you will see that the \"spirit of the Lord was upon Jephthah\"\nwhen he made the cruel vow. If Paul did not commend Jephthah for keeping\nthis vow, what was the act that excited his admiration? Was it because\nJephthah slew on the banks of the Jordan \"forty and two thousand\" of the\nsons of Ephraim?\n\nIn regard to Abraham, the argument is precisely the same, except that\nJehovah is said to have interfered, and allowed an animal to be slain\ninstead.\n\nOne of the answers given by you is that \"it may be allowed that the\nnarrative is not within our comprehension\"; and for that reason you\nsay that \"it behooves us to tread cautiously in approaching it.\" Why\ncautiously?\n\nThese stories of Abraham and Jephthah have cost many an innocent life.\nOnly a few years ago, here in my country, a man by the name of Freeman,\nbelieving that God demanded at least the show of obedience—believing\nwhat he had read in the Old Testament that \"without the shedding of\nblood there is no remission,\" and so believing, touched with insanity,\nsacrificed his little girl—plunged into her innocent breast the dagger,\nbelieving it to be God's will, and thinking that if it were not God's\nwill his hand would be stayed.\n\nI know of nothing more pathetic than the story of this crime told by\nthis man.\n\nNothing can be more monstrous than the conception of a God who demands\nsacrifice—of a God who would ask of a father that he murder his\nson—of a father that he would burn his daughter. It is far beyond my\ncomprehension how any man ever could have believed such an infinite,\nsuch a cruel absurdity.\n\nAt the command of the real God—if there be one—I would not sacrifice\nmy child, I would not murder my wife. But as long as there are people\nin the world whose minds are so that they can believe the stories of\nAbraham and Jephthah, just so long there will be men who will take the\nlives of the ones they love best.\n\nYou have taken the position that the conditions are different; and you\nsay that: \"According to the book of Genesis, Adam and Eve were placed\nunder a law, not of consciously perceived right and wrong, but of simple\nobedience. The tree of which alone they were forbidden to eat was the\ntree of the knowledge of good and evil; duty lay for them in following\nthe command of the Most High, before and until they became capable of\nappreciating it by an ethical standard. Their knowledge was but that of\nan infant who has just reached the stage at which he can comprehend that\nhe is ordered to do this or that, but not the nature of the things so\nordered.\".\n\nIf Adam and Eve could not \"consciously perceive right and wrong,\" how\nis it possible for you to say that \"duty lay for them in following the\ncommand of the Most High\"? How can a person \"incapable of perceiving\nright and wrong\" have an idea of duty? You are driven to say that Adam\nand Eve had no moral sense. How under such circumstances could they have\nthe sense of guilt, or of obligation? And why should such persons be\npunished? And why should the whole human race become tainted by the\noffence of those who had no moral sense?\n\nDo you intend to be understood as saying that Jehovah allowed his\nchildren to enslave each other because \"duty lay for them in following\nthe command of the Most High\"? Was it for this reason that he caused\nthem to exterminate each other? Do you account for the severity of his\npunishments by the fact that the poor creatures punished were not aware\nof the enormity of the offences they had committed? What shall we say of\na God who has one of his children stoned to death for picking up sticks\non Sunday, and allows another to enslave his fellow-man? Have you\ndiscovered any theory that will account for both of these facts?\n\nAnother word as to Abraham:—You defend his willingness to kill his son\nbecause \"the estimate of human life at the time was different\"—because\n\"the position of the father in the family was different; its members\nwere regarded as in some sense his property;\" and because \"there is\nevery reason to suppose that around Abraham in the 'land of Moriah' the\npractice of human sacrifice as an act of religion was in full vigor.\"\n\nLet us examine these three excuses: Was Jehovah justified in putting a\nlow estimate on human life? Was he in earnest when he said \"that whoso\nsheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed\"? Did he pander\nto the barbarian view of the worthlessness of life? If the estimate of\nhuman life was low, what was the sacrifice worth?\n\nWas the son the property of the father? Did Jehovah uphold this savage\nview? Had the father the right to sell or kill his child?\n\nDo you defend Jehovah and Abraham because the ignorant wretches in the\n\"land of Moriah,\" knowing nothing of the true God, cut the throats of\ntheir babes \"as an act of religion\"?\n\nWas Jehovah led away by the example of the Gods of Moriah? Do you not\nsee that your excuses are simply the suggestions of other crimes?\n\nYou see clearly that the Hindoo mother, when she throws her babe into\nthe Ganges at the command of her God, \"sins against first principles\";\nbut you excuse Abraham because he lived in the childhood of the race.\nCan Jehovah be excused because of his youth? Not satisfied with your\nexplanation, your defences and excuses, you take the ground that when\nAbraham said: \"My son, God will provide a lamb for a burnt offering,\"\nhe may have \"believed implicitly that a way of rescue would be found for\nhis son.\" In other words, that Abraham did not believe that he would be\nrequired to shed the blood of Isaac. So that, after all, the faith of\nAbraham consisted in \"believing implicitly\" that Jehovah was not in\nearnest.\n\nYou have discovered a way by which, as you think, the neck of orthodoxy\ncan escape the noose of Darwin, and in that connection you use this\nremarkable language:\n\n\"I should reply that the moral history of man, in its principal stream,\nhas been distinctly an evolution from the first until now.\" It is hard\nto see how this statement agrees with the one in the beginning of your\nRemarks, in which you speak of the human constitution in its \"warped,\nimpaired and dislocated\" condition. When you wrote that line you were\ncertainly a theologian—a believer in the Episcopal creed—and your\nmind, by mere force of habit, was at that moment contemplating man as\nhe is supposed to have been created—perfect in every part. At that time\nyou were endeavoring to account for the unbelief now in the world, and\nyou did this by stating that the human constitution is \"warped, impaired\nand dislocated\"; but the moment you are brought face to face with the\ngreat truths uttered by Darwin, you admit \"that the moral history of man\nhas been distinctly an evolution from the first until now.\" Is not this\na fountain that brings forth sweet and bitter waters?\n\nI insist, that the discoveries of Darwin do away absolutely with the\ninspiration of the Scriptures—with the account of creation in Genesis,\nand demonstrate not simply the falsity, not simply the wickedness, but\nthe foolishness of the \"sacred volume.\" There is nothing in Darwin to\nshow that all has been evolved from \"primal night and from chaos.\" There\nis no evidence of \"primal night.\" There is no proof of universal chaos.\nDid your Jehovah spend an eternity in \"primal night,\" with no companion\nbut chaos.\n\nIt makes no difference how long a lower form may require to reach a\nhigher. It makes no difference whether forms can be simply modified or\nabsolutely changed. These facts have not the slightest tendency to throw\nthe slightest light on the beginning or on the destiny of things.\n\nI most cheerfully admit that gods have the right to create swiftly\nor slowly. The reptile may become a bird in one day, or in a thousand\nbillion years—this fact has nothing to do with the existence or\nnon-existence of a first cause, but it has something to do with the\ntruth of the Bible, and with the existence of a personal God of infinite\npower and wisdom.\n\nDoes not a gradual improvement in the thing created show a corresponding\nimprovement in the creator? The church demonstrated the falsity and\nfolly of Darwin's theories by showing that they contradicted the Mosaic\naccount of creation, and now the theories of Darwin having been fairly\nestablished, the church says that the Mosaic account is true, because\nit is in harmony with Darwin. Now, if it should turn out that Darwin was\nmistaken, what then?\n\nTo me it is somewhat difficult to understand the mental processes of one\nwho really feels that \"the gap between man and the inferior animals or\ntheir relationship was stated, perhaps, even more emphatically by Bishop\nButler than by Darwin.\"\n\nButler answered deists, who objected to the cruelties of the Bible, and\nyet lauded the God of Nature by showing that the God of Nature is as\ncruel as the God of the Bible. That is to say, he succeeded in showing\nthat both Gods are bad. He had no possible conception of the splendid\ngeneralizations of Darwin—the great truths that have revolutionized the\nthought of the world.\n\nBut there was one question asked by Bishop Butler that throws a flame\nof light upon the probable origin of most, if not all, religions: \"Why\nmight not whole communities and public bodies be seized with fits of\ninsanity as well as individuals?\"\n\nIf you are convinced that Moses and Darwin are in exact accord, will you\nbe good enough to tell who, in your judgment, were the parents of Adam\nand Eve? Do you find in Darwin any theory that satisfactorily\naccounts for the \"inspired fact\" that a Rib, commencing with\nMonogonic Propagation—falling into halves by a contraction in the\nmiddle—reaching, after many ages of Evolution, the Amphigonie stage,\nand then, by the Survival of the Fittest, assisted by Natural Selection,\nmoulded and modified by Environment, became at last, the mother of the\nhuman race?\n\nHere is a world in which there are countless varieties of life—these\nvarieties in all probability related to each other—all living upon\neach other—everything devouring something, and in its turn devoured by\nsomething else—everywhere claw and beak, hoof and tooth,—everything\nseeking the life of something else—every drop of water a battle-field,\nevery atom being for some wild beast a jungle—every place a\ngolgotha—and such a world is declared to be the work of the infinitely\nwise and compassionate.\n\nAccording to your idea, Jehovah prepared a home for his children—first\na garden in which they should be tempted and from which they should\nbe driven; then a world filled with briers and thorns and wild and\npoisonous beasts—a world in which the air should be filled with the\nenemies of human life—a world in which disease should be contagious,\nand in which it was impossible to tell, except by actual experiment, the\npoisonous from the nutritious. And these children were allowed to live\nin dens and holes and fight their way against monstrous serpents and\ncrouching beasts—were allowed to live in ignorance and fear—to have\nfalse ideas of this good and loving God—ideas so false, that they made\nof him a fiend—ideas so false, that they sacrificed their wives and\nbabes to appease the imaginary wrath of this monster. And this God\ngave to different nations different ideas of himself, knowing that in\nconsequence of that these nations would meet upon countless fields of\ndeath and drain each other's veins.\n\nWould it not have been better had the world been so that parents would\ntransmit only their virtues—only their perfections, physical and\nmental,—allowing their diseases and their vices to perish with them?\n\nIn my reply to Dr. Field I had asked: Why should God demand a sacrifice\nfrom man? Why should the infinite ask anything from the finite? Should\nthe sun beg from the glowworm, and should the momentary spark excite the\nenvy of the source of light?\n\nUpon which you remark, \"that if the infinite is to make no demands upon\nthe finite, by parity of reasoning, the great and strong should scarcely\nmake them on the weak and small.\" Can this be called reasoning? Why\nshould the infinite demand a sacrifice from man? In the first place, the\ninfinite is conditionless—the infinite cannot want—the infinite has.\nA conditioned being may want; but the gratification of a want involves\na change of condition. If God be conditionless, he can have no\nwants—consequently, no human being can gratify the infinite.\n\nBut you insist that \"if the infinite is to make no demands upon the\nfinite, by parity of reasoning, the great and strong should scarcely\nmake them on the weak and small.\"\n\nThe great have wants. The strong are often in need, in peril, and the\ngreat and strong often need the services of the small and weak. It\nwas the mouse that freed the lion. England is a great and powerful\nnation—yet she may need the assistance of the weakest of her citizens.\nThe world is filled with illustrations.\n\nThe lack of logic is in this: The infinite cannot want anything; the\nstrong and the great may, and as a fact always do. The great and the\nstrong cannot help the infinite—they can help the small and the weak,\nand the small and the weak can often help the great and strong.\n\nYou ask: \"Why then should the father make demands of love, obedience,\nand sacrifice from his young child?\"\n\nNo sensible father ever demanded love from his child. Every civilized\nfather knows that love rises like the perfume from a flower. You cannot\ncommand it by simple authority.\n\nIt cannot obey. A father demands obedience from a child for the good\nof the child and for the good of himself. But suppose the father to be\ninfinite—why should the child sacrifice anything for him?\n\nBut it may be that you answer all these questions, all these\ndifficulties, by admitting, as you have in your Remarks, \"that these\nproblems are insoluble by our understanding.\"\n\nWhy, then, do you accept them? Why do you defend that which you cannot\nunderstand? Why does your reason volunteer as a soldier under the flag\nof the incomprehensible?\n\nI asked of Dr. Field, and I ask again, this question: Why should an\ninfinitely wise and powerful God destroy the good and preserve the vile?\n\nWhat do I mean by this question? Simply this: The earthquake, the\nlightning, the pestilence, are no respecters of persons. The vile are\nnot always destroyed, the good are not always saved. I asked: Why should\nGod treat all alike in this world, and in another make an infinite\ndifference? This, I suppose, is \"insoluble to our understanding.\"\n\nWhy should Jehovah allow his worshipers, his adorers, to be destroyed by\nhis enemies? Can you by any possibility answer this question?\n\nYou may account for all these inconsistencies, these cruel\ncontradictions, as John Wesley accounted for earthquakes when he\ninsisted that they were produced by the wickedness of men, and that the\nonly way to prevent them was for everybody to believe on the Lord Jesus\nChrist. And you may have some way of showing that Mr. Wesley's idea is\nentirely consistent with the theories of Mr. Darwin.\n\nYou seem to think that as long as there is more goodness than evil in\nthe world—as long as there is more joy than sadness—we are compelled\nto infer that the author of the world is infinitely good, powerful, and\nwise, and that as long as a majority are out of gutters and prisons, the\n\"divine scheme\" is a success.\n\nAccording to this system of logic, if there were a few more\nunfortunates—if there was just a little more evil than good—then\nwe would be driven to acknowledge that the world was created by an\ninfinitely malevolent being.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the history of the world has been such that not\nonly your theologians but your apostles, and not only your apostles but\nyour prophets, and not only your prophets but your Jehovah, have all\nbeen forced to account for the evil, the injustice and the suffering, by\nthe wickedness of man, the natural depravity of the human heart and the\nwiles and machinations of a malevolent being second only in power to\nJehovah himself.\n\nAgain and again you have called me to account for \"mere suggestions\nand assertions without proof\"; and yet your remarks are filled with\nassertions and mere suggestions without proof.\n\nYou admit that \"great believers are not able to explain the inequalities\nof adjustment between human beings and the conditions in which they have\nbeen set down to work out their destiny.\"\n\nHow do you know \"that they have been set down to work out their\ndestiny\"? If that was, and is, the purpose, then the being who settled\nthe \"destiny,\" and the means by which it tvas to be \"worked out,\" is\nresponsible for all that happens.\n\nAnd is this the end of your argument, \"That you are not able to explain\nthe inequalities of adjustment between human beings\"? Is the solution\nof this problem beyond your power? Does the Bible shed no light? Is the\nChristian in the presence of this question as dumb as the agnostic? When\nthe injustice of this world is so flagrant that you cannot harmonize\nthat awful fact with the wisdom and goodness of an infinite God, do you\nnot see that you have surrendered, or at least that you have raised\na flag of truce beneath which your adversary accepts as final your\nstatement that you do not know and that your imagination is not\nsufficient to frame an excuse for God?\n\nIt gave me great pleasure to find that at last even you have been driven\nto say that: \"it is a duty incumbent upon us respectively according\nto our means and opportunities, to decide by the use of the faculty of\nreason given us, the great questions of natural and revealed religion.\"\n\nYou admit \"that I am to decide for myself, by the use of my reason,\"\nwhether the Bible is the word of God or not—whether there is any\nrevealed religion—and whether there be or be not an infinite being who\ncreated and who governs this world.\n\nYou also admit that we are to decide these questions according to the\nbalance of the evidence.\n\nIs this in accordance with the doctrine of Jehovah? Did Jehovah say to\nthe husband that if his wife became convinced, according to her means\nand her opportunities, and decided according to her reason, that it was\nbetter to worship some other God than Jehovah, then that he was to say\nto her: \"You are entitled to decide according to the balance of the\nevidence as it seems to you\"?\n\nHave you abandoned Jehovah? Is man more just than he? Have you appealed\nfrom him to the standard of reason? Is it possible that the leader of\nthe English Liberals is nearer civilized than Jehovah?\n\nDo you know that in this sentence you demonstrate the existence of a\ndawn in your mind? This sentence makes it certain that in the East of\nthe midnight of Episcopal superstition there is the herald of the coming\nday. And if this sentence shows a dawn, what shall I say of the next:\n\n\"We are not entitled, either for or against belief, to set up in this\nprovince any rule of investigation except such as common sense teaches\nus to use in the ordinary conduct of life\"?\n\nThis certainly is a morning star. Let me take this statement, let me\nhold it as a torch, and by its light I beg of you to read the Bible once\nagain.\n\nIs it in accordance with reason that an infinitely good and loving God\nwould drown a world that he had taken no means to civilize—to whom he\nhad given no bible, no gospel,—taught no scientific fact and in which\nthe seeds of art had not been sown; that he would create a world that\nought to be drowned? That a being of infinite wisdom would create a\nrival, knowing that the rival would fill perdition with countless souls\ndestined to suffer eternal pain? Is it according to common sense that\nan infinitely good God would order some of his children to kill others?\nThat he would command soldiers to rip open with the sword of war the\nbodies of women—wreaking vengeance on babes unborn? Is it according to\nreason that a good, loving, compassionate, and just God would establish\nslavery among men, and that a pure God would uphold polygamy? Is it\naccording to common sense that he who wished to make men merciful and\nloving would demand the sacrifice of animals, so that his altars would\nbe wet with the blood of oxen, sheep, and doves? Is it according\nto reason that a good God would inflict tortures upon his ignorant\nchildren—that he would torture animals to death—and is it in\naccordance with common sense and reason that this God would create\ncountless billions of people knowing that they would be eternally\ndamned?\n\nWhat is common sense? Is it the result of observation, reason and\nexperience, or is it the child of credulity?\n\nThere is this curious fact: The far past and the far future seem to\nbelong to the miraculous and the monstrous. The present, as a rule, is\nthe realm of common sense. If you say to a man: \"Eighteen hundred years\nago the dead were raised,\" he will reply: \"Yes, I know that.\" And if you\nsay: \"A hundred thousand years from now all the dead will be raised,\" he\nwill probably reply: \"I presume so.\" But if you tell him: \"I saw a dead\nman raised to-day,\" he will ask, \"From what madhouse have you escaped?\"\n\nThe moment we decide \"according to reason,\" \"according to the balance\nof evidence,\" we are charged with \"having violated the laws of social\nmorality and decency,\" and the defender of the miraculous and the\nincomprehensible takes another position.\n\nThe theologian has a city of refuge to which he flies—an old breastwork\nbehind which he kneels—a rifle-pit into which he crawls. You have\ndescribed this city, this breastwork, this rifle-pit and also the leaf\nunder which the ostrich of theology thrusts its head. Let me quote:\n\n\"Our demands for evidence must be limited by the general reason of\nthe case. Does that general reason of the case make it probable that a\nfinite being, with a finite place in a comprehensive scheme devised and\nadministered by a being who is infinite, would be able even to embrace\nwithin his view, or rightly to appreciate all the motives or aims that\nthere may have been in the mind of the divine disposer?\"\n\nAnd this is what you call \"deciding by the use of the faculty of\nreason,\" \"according to the evidence,\" or at least \"according to the\nbalance of evidence.\" This is a conclusion reached by a \"rule of\ninvestigation such as common sense teaches us to use in the ordinary\nconduct of life.\" Will you have the kindness to explain what it is to\nact contrary to evidence, or contrary to common sense? Can you imagine a\nsuperstition so gross that it cannot be defended by that argument?\n\nNothing, it seems to me, could have been easier than for Jehovah to have\nreasonably explained his scheme. You may answer that the human intellect\nis not sufficient to understand the explanation. Why then do not\ntheologians stop explaining? Why do they feel it incumbent upon them\nto explain that which they admit God would have explained had the human\nmind been capable of understanding it?\n\nHow much better would it have been if Jehovah had said a few things on\nthese subjects. It always seemed wonderful to me that he spent several\ndays and nights on Mount Sinai explain* ing to Moses how he could\ndetect the presence of leprosy, without once thinking to give him a\nprescription for its cure.\n\nThere were thousands and thousands of opportunities for this God to\nwithdraw from these questions the shadow and the cloud. When Jehovah out\nof the whirlwind asked questions of Job, how much better it would have\nbeen if Job had asked and Jehovah had answered.\n\nYou say that we should be governed by evidence and by common sense. Then\nyou tell us that the questions are beyond the reach of reason, and with\nwhich common sense has nothing to do. If we then ask for an explanation,\nyou reply in the scornful challenge of Dante.\n\nYou seem to imagine that every man who gives an opinion, takes his\nsolemn oath that the opinion is the absolute end of all investigation on\nthat subject.\n\nIn my opinion, Shakespeare was, intellectually, the greatest of the\nhuman race, and my intention was simply to express that view. It never\noccurred to me that any one would suppose that I thought Shakespeare\na greater actor than Garrick, a more wonderful composer than Wagner, a\nbetter violinist than Remenyi, or a heavier man than Daniel Lambert. It\nis to be regretted that you were misled by my words and really supposed\nthat I intended to say that Shakespeare was a greater general than\nCaesar. But, after all, your criticism has no possible bearing on the\npoint at issue. Is it an effort to avoid that which cannot be met?\nThe real question is this: If we cannot account for Christ without a\nmiracle, how can we account for Shakespeare? Dr. Field took the ground\nthat Christ himself was a miracle; that it was impossible to account for\nsuch a being in any natural way; and, guided by common sense, guided\nby the rule of investigation such as common sense teaches, I called\nattention to Buddha, Mohammed, Confucius, and Shakespeare.\n\nIn another place in your Remarks, when my statement about Shakespeare\nwas not in your mind, you say: \"All is done by steps—nothing by\nstrides, leaps or bounds—all from protoplasm up to Shakespeare.\" Why\ndid you end the series with Shakespeare? Did you intend to say Dante, or\nBishop Butler?\n\nIt is curious to see how much ingenuity a great man exercises when\nguided by what he calls \"the rule of investigation as suggested\nby common sense.\" I pointed out some things that Christ did not\nteach—among others, that he said nothing with regard to the family\nrelation, nothing against slavery, nothing about education, nothing as\nto the rights and duties of nations, nothing as to any scientific truth.\nAnd this is answered by saying that \"I am quite able to point out the\nway in which the Savior of the world might have been much greater as a\nteacher than he actually was.\"\n\nIs this an answer, or is it simply taking refuge behind a name? Would it\nnot have been better if Christ had told his disciples that they must not\npersecute; that they had no right to destroy their fellow-men; that they\nmust not put heretics in dungeons, or destroy them with flames; that\nthey must not invent and use instruments of torture; that they must not\nappeal to brutality, nor endeavor to sow with bloody hands the seeds\nof peace? Would it not have been far better had he said: \"I come not to\nbring a sword, but peace\"? Would not this have saved countless cruelties\nand countless lives?\n\nYou seem to think that you have fully answered my objection when you say\nthat Christ taught the absolute indissolubility of marriage.\n\nWhy should a husband and wife be compelled to live with each other after\nlove is dead? Why should the wife still be bound in indissoluble chains\nto a husband who is cruel, infamous, and false? Why should her life be\ndestroyed because of his? Why should she be chained to a criminal and an\noutcast? Nothing can be more unphilosophic than this. Why fill the world\nwith the children of indifference and hatred?\n\nThe marriage contract is the most important, the most sacred, that human\nbeings can make. It will be sacredly kept by good men and by good women.\nBut if a loving woman—tender, noble, and true—makes this contract with\na man whom she believed to be worthy of all respect and love, and who is\nfound to be a cruel, worthless wretch, why should her life be lost?\n\nDo you not know that the indissolubility of the marriage contract leads\nto its violation, forms an excuse for immorality, eats out the very\nheart of truth, and gives to vice that which alone belongs to love?\n\nBut in order that you may know why the objection was raised, I call your\nattention to the fact that Christ offered a reward, not only in this\nworld but in another, to any husband who would desert his wife. And do\nyou know that this hideous offer caused millions to desert their wives\nand children?\n\nTheologians have the habit of using names instead of arguments—of\nappealing to some man, great in some direction, to establish their\ncreed; but we all know that no man is great enough to be an authority,\nexcept in that particular domain in which he won his eminence; and we\nall know that great men are not great in all directions. Bacon died\na believer in the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. Tycho Brahe kept an\nimbecile in his service, putting down with great care the words that\nfell from the hanging lip of idiocy, and then endeavored to put them\ntogether in a way to form prophecies. Sir Matthew Hale believed in\nwitchcraft not only, but in its lowest and most vulgar forms; and some\nof the greatest men of antiquity examined the entrails of birds to find\nthe secrets of the future.\n\nIt has always seemed to me that reasons are better than names.\n\nAfter taking the ground that Christ could not have been a greater\nteacher than he actually was, you ask: \"Where would have been the\nwisdom of delivering to an uninstructed population of a particular age\na codified religion which was to serve for all nations, all ages, all\nstates of civilization?\"\n\nDoes not this question admit that the teachings of Christ will not serve\nfor all nations, all ages and all states of civilization?\n\nBut let me ask: If it was necessary for Christ \"to deliver to an\nuninstructed population of a particular age a certain religion suited\nonly for that particular age,\" why should a civilized and scientific age\neighteen hundred years afterwards be absolutely bound by that religion?\nDo you not see that your position cannot be defended, and that you have\nprovided no way for retreat? If the religion of Christ was for that age,\nis it for this? Are you willing to admit that the Ten Commandments\nare not for all time? If, then, four thousand years before Christ,\ncommandments were given not simply for \"an uninstructed population of\na particular age, but for all time,\" can you give a reason why the\nreligion of Christ should not have been of the same character?\n\nIn the first place you say that God has revealed himself to the\nworld—that he has revealed a religion; and in the next place, that \"he\nhas not revealed a perfect religion, for the reason that no room would\nbe left for the career of human thought.\"\n\nWhy did not God reveal this imperfect religion to all people instead of\nto a small and insignificant tribe, a tribe without commerce and without\ninfluence among the nations of the world? Why did he hide this imperfect\nlight under a bushel? If the light was necessary for one, was it not\nnecessary for all? And why did he drown a world to whom he had not even\ngiven that light? According to your reasoning, would there not have been\nleft greater room for the career of human thought, had no revelation\nbeen made?\n\nYou say that \"you have known a person who after studying the old\nclassical or Olympian religion for a third part of a century, at length\nbegan to hope that he had some partial comprehension of it—some\ninkling of what is meant.\" You say this for the purpose of showing how\nimpossible it is to understand the Bible. If it is so difficult, why do\nyou call it a revelation? And yet, according to your creed, the man\nwho does not understand the revelation and believe it, or who does not\nbelieve it, whether he understands it or not, is to reap the harvest of\neverlasting pain. Ought not the revelation to be revealed?\n\nIn order to escape from the fact that Christ denounced the chosen people\nof God as \"a generation of vipers\" and as \"whited sepulchres,\" you take\nthe ground that the scribes and pharisees were not the chosen people.\nOf what blood were they? It will not do to say that they were not the\npeople. Can you deny that Christ addressed the chosen people when he\nsaid: \"Jerusalem, which killest the prophets and stonest them that are\nsent unto thee\"?\n\nYou have called me to an account for what I said in regard to Ananias\nand Sapphira. First, I am charged with having said that the apostles\nconceived the idea of having all things in common, and you denounce this\nas an interpolation; second, \"that motives of prudence are stated as\na matter of fact to have influenced the offending couple\"—and this\nis charged as an interpolation; and, third, that I stated that the\napostles sent for the wife of Ananias—and this is characterized as a\npure invention.\n\nTo me it seems reasonable to suppose that the idea of having all things\nin common was conceived by those who had nothing, or had the least, and\nnot by those who had plenty. In the last verses of the fourth chapter of\nthe Acts, you will find this:\n\n\"Neither was there any among them that lacked, for as many as were\npossessed of lands or houses sold them, and brought the prices of the\nthings that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles' feet: and\ndistribution was made unto every man according as he had need. And\nJoses, who by the apostles was surnamed Barnabas (which is, being\ninterpreted, the son of consolation), a Levite and of the country of\nCyprus, having land, sold it, and brought the money, and laid it at the\napostles' feet.\"\n\nNow it occurred to me that the idea was in all probability suggested by\nthe men at whose feet the property was laid. It never entered my mind\nthat the idea originated with those who had land for sale. There may be\na different standard by which human nature is measured in your country,\nthan in mine; but if the thing had happened in the United States, I feel\nabsolutely positive that it would have been at the suggestion of the\napostles.\n\n\"Ananias, with Sapphira, his wife, sold a possession and kept back part\nof the price, his wife also being privy to it, and brought a certain\npart and laid it at the apostles' feet.\"\n\nIn my Letter to Dr. Field I stated—not at the time pretending to quote\nfrom the New Testament—that Ananias and Sapphira, after talking the\nmatter over, not being entirely satisfied with the collaterals, probably\nconcluded to keep a little—just enough to keep them from starvation if\nthe good and pious bankers should abscond. It never occurred to me that\nany man would imagine that this was a quotation, and I feel like asking\nyour pardon for having led you into this error. We are informed in the\nBible that \"they kept back a part of the price.\" It occurred to me,\n\"judging by the rule of investigation according to common sense,\" that\nthere was a reason for this, and I could think of no reason except that\nthey did not care to trust the apostles with all, and that they kept\nback just a little, thinking it might be useful if the rest should be\nlost.\n\nAccording to the account, after Peter had made a few remarks to Ananias,\n\n\"Ananias fell down and gave up the ghost;.... and the young men arose,\nwound him up, and carried him out, and buried him. And it was about the\nspace of three hours after, when his wife, not knowing what was done,\ncame in.\"\n\nWhereupon Peter said:\n\n\"'Tell me whether ye sold the land for so much?' And she said, 'Yea,\nfor so much.' Then Peter said unto her, 'How is it that ye have agreed\ntogether to tempt the spirit of the Lord? Behold, the feet of them which\nhave buried thy husband are at the door, and shall carry thee out.' Then\nfell she down straightway at his feet, and yielded up the ghost; and the\nyoung men came in, and found her dead, and, carrying her forth, buried\nher by her husband.\"\n\nThe only objection found to this is, that I inferred that the apostles\nhad sent for her. Sending for her was not the offence. The failure to\ntell her what had happened to her husband was the offence—keeping his\nfate a secret from her in order that she might be caught in the same net\nthat had been set for her husband by Jehovah. This was the offence.\nThis was the mean and cruel thing to which I objected. Have you answered\nthat?\n\nOf course, I feel sure that the thing never occurred—the probability\nbeing that Ananias and Sapphira never lived and never died. It is\nprobably a story invented by the early church to make the collection of\nsubscriptions somewhat easier.\n\nAnd yet, we find a man in the nineteenth century, foremost of his\nfellow-citizens in the affairs of a great nation, upholding this\nbarbaric view of God.\n\nLet me beg of you to use your reason \"according to the rule suggested\nby common sense.\" Let us do what little we can to rescue the reputation,\neven of a Jewish myth, from the calumnies of Ignorance and Fear.\n\nSo, again, I am charged with having given certain words as a quotation\nfrom the Bible in which two passages are combined—\"They who believe and\nare baptized shall be saved, and they who believe not shall be damned.\nAnd these shall go away into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and\nhis angels.\"\n\nThey were given as two passages. No one for a moment supposed that\nthey would be read together as one, and no one imagined that any one in\nanswering the argument would be led to believe that they were intended\nas one. Neither was there in this the slightest negligence, as I was\nanswering a man who is perfectly familiar with the Bible. The objection\nwas too small to make. It is hardly large enough to answer—and had it\nnot been made by you it would not have been answered.\n\nYou are not satisfied with what I have said upon the subject of\nimmortality. What I said was this: The idea of immortality, that like a\nsea has ebbed and flowed in the human heart, with its countless waves of\nhope and fear beating against the shores and rocks of time and fate, was\nnot born of any book, nor of any creed, nor of any religion. It was born\nof human affection, and it will continue to ebb and flow beneath the\nmists and clouds of doubt and darkness as long as love kisses the lips\nof death.\n\nYou answer this by saying that \"the Egyptians were believers in\nimmortality, but were not a people of high intellectual development.\"\n\nHow such a statement tends to answer what I have said, is beyond my\npowers of discernment. Is there the slightest connection between my\nstatement and your objection?\n\nYou make still another answer, and say that \"the ancient Greeks were\na race of perhaps unparalled intellectual capacity, and that\nnotwithstanding that, the most powerful mind of the Greek philosophy,\nthat of Aristotle, had no clear conception of a personal existence in a\nfuture state.\" May I be allowed to ask this simple question: Who has?\n\nAre you urging an objection to the dogma of immortality, when you say\nthat a race of unparalled intellectual capacity had no confidence in\nit? Is that a doctrine believed only by people who lack intellectual\ncapacity? I stated that the idea of immortality was born of love, You\nreply, \"the Egyptians believed it, but they were not intellectual.\" Is\nnot this a non sequitur? The question is: Were they a loving people?\n\nDoes history show that there is a moral governor of the world? What\nwitnesses shall we call? The billions of slaves who were paid with\nblows?—the countless mothers whose babes were sold? Have we time to\nexamine the Waldenses, the Covenanters of Scotland, the Catholics of\nIreland, the victims of St. Bartholomew, of the Spanish Inquisition, all\nthose who have died in flames? Shall we hear the story of Bruno? Shall\nwe ask Servetus? Shall we ask the millions slaughtered by Christian\nswords in America—all the victims of ambition, of perjury, of\nignorance, of superstition and revenge, of storm and earthquake, of\nfamine, flood and fire?\n\nCan all the agonies and crimes, can all the inequalities of the world\nbe answered by reading the \"noble Psalm\" in which are found the words:\n\"Call upon me in the day of trouble, so I will hear thee, and thou shalt\npraise me\"? Do you prove the truth of these fine words, this honey of\nTrebizond, by the victims of religious persecution? Shall we hear the\nsighs and sobs of Siberia?\n\nAnother thing. Why should you, from the page of Greek history, with the\nsponge of your judgment, wipe out all names but one, and tell us that\nthe most powerful mind of the Greek philosophy was that of Aristotle?\nHow did you ascertain this fact? Is it not fair to suppose that you\nmerely intended to say that, according to your view, Aristotle had the\nmost powerful mind among all the philosophers of Greece? I should not\ncall attention to this, except for your criticism on a like remark of\nmine as to the intellectual superiority of Shakespeare. But if you knew\nthe trouble I have had in finding out your meaning, from your words, you\nwould pardon me for calling attention to a single line from Aristotle:\n\"Clearness is the virtue of style.\"\n\nTo me Epicurus seems far greater than Aristotle, He had clearer\nvision. His cheek was closer to the breast of nature, and he planted his\nphilosophy nearer to the bed-rock of fact. He was practical enough to\nknow that virtue is the means and happiness the end; that the highest\nphilosophy is the art of living. He was wise enough to say that nothing\nis of the slightest value to man that does not increase or preserve\nhis wellbeing, and he was great enough to know and courageous enough\nto declare that all the gods and ghosts were monstrous phantoms born of\nignorance and fear.\n\nI still insist that human affection is the foundation of the idea of\nimmortality; that love was the first to speak that word, no matter\nwhether they who spoke it were savage or civilized, Egyptian or Greek.\nBut if we are immortal—if there be another world—why was it not\nclearly set forth in the Old Testament? Certainly, the authors of that\nbook had an opportunity to learn it from the Egyptians. Why was it not\nrevealed by Jehovah? Why did he waste his time in giving orders for the\nconsecration of priests—in saying that they must have sheep's blood\nput on their right ears and on their right thumbs and on their right big\ntoes? Could a God with any sense of humor give such directions, or watch\nwithout huge laughter the performance of such a ceremony? In order to\nsee the beauty, the depth and tenderness of such a consecration, is it\nessential to be in a state of \"reverential calm\"?\n\nIs it not strange that Christ did not tell of another world distinctly,\nclearly, without parable, and without the mist of metaphor?\n\nThe fact is that the Hindoos, the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the\nRomans taught the immortality of the soul, not as a glittering guess—a\npossible perhaps—but as a clear and demonstrated truth for many\ncenturies before the birth of Christ.\n\nIf the Old Testament proves anything, it is that death ends all. And the\nNew Testament, by basing immortality on the resurrection of the body,\nbut \"keeps the word of promise to our ear and breaks it to our hope.\"\n\nIn my Reply to Dr. Field, I said: \"The truth is, that no one can justly\nbe held responsible for his thoughts. The brain thinks without asking\nour consent; we believe, or disbelieve, without an effort of the will.\nBelief is a result. It is the effect of evidence upon the mind. The\nscales turn in spite of him who watches. There is no opportunity of\nbeing honest or dishonest in the formation of an opinion. The conclusion\nis entirely independent of desire. We must believe, or we must doubt, in\nspite of what we wish.\"\n\nDoes the brain think without our consent? Can we control our thought?\nCan we tell what we are going to think tomorrow?\n\nCan we stop thinking?\n\nIs belief the result of that which to us is evidence, or is it a product\nof the will? Can the scales in which reason weighs evidence be turned by\nthe will? Why then should evidence be weighed? If it all depends on the\nwill, what is evidence? Is there any opportunity of being dishonest in\nthe formation of an opinion? Must not the man who forms the opinion know\nwhat it is? He cannot knowingly cheat himself. He cannot be deceived\nwith dice that he loads. He cannot play unfairly at solitaire without\nknowing that he has lost the game. He cannot knowingly weigh with false\nscales and believe in the correctness of the result.\n\nYou have not even attempted to answer my arguments upon these points,\nbut you have unconsciously avoided them. You did not attack the citadel.\nIn military parlance, you proceeded to \"shell the woods.\" The noise is\nprecisely the same as though every shot had been directed against the\nenemy's position, but the result is not. You do not seem willing to\nimplicitly trust the correctness of your aim. You prefer to place the\ntarget after the shot.\n\nThe question is whether the will knowingly can change evidence, and\nwhether there is any opportunity of being dishonest in the formation\nof an opinion. You have changed the issue. You have erased the word\nformation and interpolated the word expression.\n\nLet us suppose that a man has given an opinion, knowing that it is not\nbased on any fact. Can you say that he has given his opinion? The moment\na prejudice is known to be a prejudice, it disappears. Ignorance is the\nsoil in which prejudice must grow. Touched by a ray of light, it dies.\nThe judgment of man may be warped by prejudice and passion, but it\ncannot be consciously warped. It is impossible for any man to be\ninfluenced by a known prejudice, because a known prejudice cannot exist.\n\nI am not contending that all opinions have been honestly expressed. What\nI contend is that when a dishonest opinion has been expressed it is not\nthe opinion that was formed.\n\nThe cases suggested by you are not in point. Fathers are honestly\nswayed, if really swayed, by love; and queens and judges have pretended\nto be swayed by the highest motives, by the clearest evidence, in order\nthat they might kill rivals, reap rewards, and gratify revenge. But what\nhas all this to do with the fact that he who watches the scales in which\nevidence is weighed knows the actual result?\n\nLet us examine your case: If a father is consciously swayed by his\nlove for his son, and for that reason says that his son is innocent,\nthen he has not expressed his opinion. If he is unconsciously swayed\nand says that his son is innocent, then he has expressed his opinion. In\nboth instances his opinion was independent of his will; but in the first\ninstance he did not express his opinion. You will certainly see this\ndistinction between the formation and the expression of an opinion.\n\nThe same argument applies to the man who consciously has a desire to\ncondemn. Such a conscious desire cannot affect the testimony—cannot\naffect the opinion. Queen Elizabeth undoubtedly desired the death\nof Mary Stuart, but this conscious desire could not have been the\nfoundation on which rested Elizabeth's opinion as to the guilt or\ninnocence of her rival. It is barely possible that Elizabeth did not\nexpress her real opinion. Do you believe that the English judges in\nthe matter of the Popish Plot gave judgment in accordance with their\nopinions? Are you satisfied that Napoleon expressed his real opinion\nwhen he justified himself for the assassination of the Duc d'Enghien?\n\nIf you answer these questions in the affirmative, you admit that I am\nright. If you answer in the negative, you admit that you are wrong. The\nmoment you admit that the opinion formed cannot be changed by expressing\na pretended opinion, your argument is turned against yourself.\n\nIt is admitted that prejudice strengthens, weakens and colors evidence;\nbut prejudice is honest. And when one acts knowingly against the\nevidence, that is not by reason of prejudice.\n\nAccording to my views of propriety, it would be unbecoming for me to\nsay that your argument on these questions is \"a piece of plausible\nshallowness.\" Such language might be regarded as lacking \"reverential\ncalm,\" and I therefore refrain from even characterizing it as plausible.\n\nIs it not perfectly apparent that you have changed the issue, and that\ninstead of showing that opinions are creatures of the will, you have\ndiscussed the quality of actions? What have corrupt and cruel judgments\npronounced by corrupt and cruel judges to do with their real opinions?\nWhen a judge forms one opinion and renders another he is called corrupt.\nThe corruption does not consist in forming his opinion, but in rendering\none that he did not form. Does a dishonest creditor, who incorrectly\nadds a number of items making the aggregate too large, necessarily\nchange his opinion as to the relations of numbers? When an error is\nknown, it is not a mistake; but a conclusion reached by a mistake, or by\na prejudice, or by both, is a necessary conclusion. He who pretends to\ncome to a conclusion by a mistake which he knows is not a mistake, knows\nthat he has not expressed his real opinion.\n\nCan any thing be more illogical than the assertion that because a boy\nreaches, through negligence in adding figures, a wrong result, that\nhe is accountable for his opinion of the result? If he knew he was\nnegligent, what must his opinion of the result have been?\n\nSo with the man who boldly announces that he has discovered the\nnumerical expression of the relation sustained by the diameter to the\ncircumference of a circle. If he is honest in the announcement, then the\nannouncement was caused not by his will but by his ignorance. His will\ncannot make the announcement true, and he could not by any possibility\nhave supposed that his will could affect the correctness of his\nannouncement. The will of one who thinks that he has invented or\ndiscovered what is called perpetual motion, is not at fault. The man, if\nhonest, has been misled; if not honest, he endeavors to mislead others.\nThere is prejudice, and prejudice does raise a clamor, and the intellect\nis affected and the judgment is darkened and the opinion is deformed;\nbut the prejudice is real and the clamor is sincere and the judgment is\nupright and the opinion is honest.\n\nThe intellect is not always supreme. It is surrounded by clouds.\nIt sometimes sits in darkness. It is often misled—sometimes, in\nsuperstitious fear, it abdicates. It is not always a white light. The\npassions and prejudices are prismatic—they color thoughts. Desires\nbetray the judgment and cunningly mislead the will.\n\nYou seem to think that the fact of responsibility is in danger unless\nit rests upon the will, and this will you regard as something without\na cause, springing into being in some mysterious way, without father or\nmother, without seed or soil, or rain or light. You must admit that man\nis a conditioned being—that he has wants, objects, ends, and aims, and\nthat these are gratified and attained only by the use of means. Do not\nthese wants and these objects have something to do with the will, and\ndoes not the intellect have something to do with the means? Is not the\nwill a product? Independently of conditions, can it exist? Is it not\nnecessarily produced? Behind every wish and thought, every dream and\nfancy, every fear and hope, are there not countless causes? Man\nfeels shame. What does this prove? He pities himself. What does this\ndemonstrate?\n\nThe dark continent of motive and desire has never been explored. In the\nbrain, that wondrous world with one inhabitant, there are recesses dim\nand dark, treacherous sands and dangerous shores, where seeming sirens\ntempt and fade; streams that rise in unknown lands from hidden springs,\nstrange seas with ebb and flow of tides, resistless billows urged by\nstorms of flame, profound and awful depths hidden by mist of dreams,\nobscure and phantom realms where vague and fearful things are half\nrevealed, jungles where passion's tigers crouch, and skies of cloud and\nblue where fancies fly with painted wings that dazzle and mislead; and\nthe poor sovereign of this pictured world is led by old desires and\nancient hates, and stained by crimes of many vanished years, and pushed\nby hands that long ago were dust, until he feels like some bewildered\nslave that Mockery has throned and crowned.\n\nNo one pretends that the mind of man is perfect—that it is not affected\nby desires, colored by hopes, weakened by fears, deformed by ignorance\nand distorted by superstition. But all this has nothing to do with the\ninnocence of opinion.\n\nIt may be that the Thugs were taught that murder is innocent; but\ndid the teachers believe what they taught? Did the pupils believe the\nteachers? Did not Jehovah teach that the act that we describe as murder\nwas a duty? Were not his teachings practiced by Moses and Joshua and\nJephthah and Samuel and David? Were they honest? But what has all this\nto do with the point at issue?\n\nSociety has the right to protect itself, even from honest murderers\nand conscientious thieves. The belief of the criminal does not disarm\nsociety; it protects itself from him as from a poisonous serpent, or\nfrom a beast that lives on human flesh. We are under no obligation\nto stand still and allow ourselves to be murdered by one who honestly\nthinks that it is his duty to take our lives. And yet according to your\nargument, we have no right to defend ourselves from honest Thugs. Was\nSaul of Tarsus a Thug when he persecuted Christians \"even unto strange\ncities\"? Is the Thug of India more ferocious than Torquemada, the Thug\nof Spain?\n\nIf belief depends upon the will, can all men have correct opinions\nwho will to have them? Acts are good or bad, according to their\nconsequences, and not according to the intentions of the actors. Honest\nopinions may be wrong, and opinions dishonestly expressed may be right.\n\nDo you mean to say that because passion and prejudice, the reckless\n\"pilots 'twixt the dangerous shores of will and judgment,\" sway the\nmind, that the opinions which you have expressed in your Remarks to me\nare not your opinions? Certainly you will admit that in all probability\nyou have prejudices and passions, and if so, can the opinions that\nyou have expressed, according to your argument, be honest? My lack of\nconfidence in your argument gives me perfect confidence in your candor.\nYou may remember the philosopher who retained his reputation for\nveracity, in spite of the fact that he kept saying: \"There is no truth\nin man.\"\n\nAre only those opinions honest that are formed without any interference\nof passion, affection, habit or fancy? What would the opinion of a man\nwithout passions, affections, or fancies be worth? The alchemist gave\nup his search for an universal solvent upon being asked in what kind of\nvessel he expected to keep it when found.\n\nIt may be admitted that Biel \"shows us how the life of Dante co-operated\nwith his extraordinary natural gifts and capabilities to make him what\nhe was,\" but does this tend to show that Dante changed his opinions\nby an act of his will, or that he reached honest opinions by knowingly\nusing false weights and measures?\n\nYou must admit that the opinions, habits and religions of men depend, at\nleast in some degree, on race, occupation, training and capacity. Is\nnot every thoughtful man compelled to agree with Edgar Fawcett, in\nwhose brain are united the beauty of the poet and the subtlety of the\nlogician,\n    \"Who sees how vice her venom wreaks\n    On the frail babe before it speaks,\n    And how heredity enslaves\n    With ghostly hands that reach from graves\"?\n\nWhy do you hold the intellect criminally responsible for opinions, when\nyou admit that it is controlled by the will? And why do you hold the\nwill responsible, when you insist that it is swayed by the passions\nand affections? But all this has nothing to do with the fact that every\nopinion has been honestly formed, whether honestly expressed or not.\n\nNo one pretends that all governments have been honestly formed and\nhonestly administered. All vices, and some virtues are represented in\nmost nations. In my opinion a republic is far better than a monarchy.\nThe legally expressed will of the people is the only rightful sovereign.\nThis sovereignty, however, does not embrace the realm of thought or\nopinion. In that world, each human being is a sovereign,—throned and\ncrowned: One is a majority. The good citizens of that realm give to\nothers all rights that they claim for themselves, and those who appeal\nto force are the only traitors.\n\nThe existence of theological despotisms, of God-anointed kings, does\nnot tend to prove that a known prejudice can determine the weight of\nevidence. When men were so ignorant as to suppose that God would\ndestroy them unless they burned heretics, they lighted the fagots in\nselfdefence.\n\nFeeling as I do that man is not responsible for his opinions, I\ncharacterized persecution for opinion's sake as infamous. So, it is\nperfectly clear to me, that it would be the infamy of infamies for an\ninfinite being to create vast numbers of men knowing that they would\nsuffer eternal pain. If an infinite God creates a man on purpose to damn\nhim, or creates him knowing that he will be damned, is not the crime the\nsame? We make mistakes and failures because we are finite; but can you\nconceive of any excuse for an infinite being who creates failures? If\nyou had the power to change, by a wish, a statue into a human being,\nand you knew that this being would die without a \"change of heart\" and\nsuffer endless pain, what would you do?\n\nCan you think of any excuse for an earthly father, who, having wealth,\nlearning and leisure, leaves his own children in ignorance and darkness?\nDo you believe that a God of infinite wisdom, justice and love, called\ncountless generations of men into being, knowing that they would be used\nas fuel for the eternal fire?\n\nMany will regret that you did not give your views upon the main\nquestions—the principal issues—involved, instead of calling attention,\nfor the most part, to the unimportant. If men were discussing the causes\nand results of the Franco-Prussian war, it would hardly be worth while\nfor a third person to interrupt the argument for the purpose of calling\nattention to a misspelled word in the terms of surrender.\n\nIf we admit that man is responsible for his opinions and his thoughts,\nand that his will is perfectly free, still these admissions do not even\ntend to prove the inspiration of the Bible, or the \"divine scheme of\nredemption.\"\n\nIn my judgment, the days of the supernatural are numbered. The dogma\nof inspiration must be abandoned. As man advances,—as his intellect\nenlarges,—as his knowledge increases,—as his ideals become nobler,\nthe bibles and creeds will lose their authority—the miraculous will be\nclassed with the impossible, and the idea of special providence will be\ndiscarded. Thousands of religions have perished, innumerable gods have\ndied, and why should the religion of our time be exempt from the common\nfate?\n\nCreeds cannot remain permanent in a world in which knowledge increases.\nScience and superstition cannot peaceably occupy the same brain. This is\nan age of investigation, of discovery and thought. Science destroys the\ndogmas that mislead the mind and waste the energies of man. It points\nout the ends that can be accomplished; takes into consideration the\nlimits of our faculties; fixes our attention on the affairs of this\nworld, and erects beacons of warning on the dangerous shores. It seeks\nto ascertain the conditions of health, to the end that life may be\nenriched and lengthened, and it reads with a smile this passage:\n\n\"And God-wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul, so that from\nhis body were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs or aprons, and the\ndiseases departed from them, and the evil spirits went out of them.\"\n\nScience is the enemy of fear and credulity. It invites investigation,\nchallenges the reason, stimulates inquiry, and welcomes the unbeliever.\nIt seeks to give food and shelter, and raiment, education and liberty to\nthe human race. It welcomes every fact and every truth. It has furnished\na foundation for morals, a philosophy for the guidance of man. From all\nbooks it selects the good, and from all theories, the true. It seeks to\ncivilize the human race by the cultivation of the intellect and'\nheart. It refines through art, music and the drama—giving voice and\nexpression to every noble thought. The mysterious does not excite the\nfeeling of worship, but the ambition to understand. It does not pray—it\nworks. It does not answer inquiry with the malicious cry of \"blasphemy.\"\nIts feelings are not hurt by contradiction, neither does it ask to be\nprotected by law from the laughter of heretics. It has taught man that\nhe cannot walk beyond the horizon—that the questions of origin and\ndestiny cannot be answered—that an infinite personality cannot be\ncomprehended by a finite being, and that the truth of any system\nof religion based on the supernatural cannot by any possibility be\nestablished—such a religion not being within the domain of evidence.\nAnd, above all, it teaches that all our duties are here—that all\nour obligations are to sentient beings; that intelligence, guided by\nkindness, is the highest possible wisdom; and that \"man believes not\nwhat he would, but what he can.\"\n\nAnd after all, it may be that \"to ride an unbroken horse with the reins\nthrown upon his neck\"—as you charge me with doing—gives a greater\nvariety of sensations, a keener delight, and a better prospect of\nwinning the race than to sit solemnly astride of a dead one, in \"a deep\nreverential calm,\" with the bridle firmly in your hand.\n\nAgain assuring you of my profound respect, I remain, Sincerely yours,\n\nRobert G. Ingersoll.\n"
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