{
  "schema": "tga.work.v1",
  "identifier": "dresden:vol-11:huxley-and-agnosticism",
  "slug": "huxley-and-agnosticism",
  "title": "Huxley and Agnosticism",
  "subtitle": "On Thomas Henry Huxley and the coinage of the word.",
  "excerpt": "On Thomas Henry Huxley, the English naturalist who coined the word 'agnostic' — and on the quarrels between him and the clergy of the Church of England.",
  "year": 1889,
  "volume": 11,
  "category": "Essay",
  "author": {
    "name": "Robert G. Ingersoll",
    "wikidata": "Q360326",
    "viaf": "44331023"
  },
  "isPartOf": {
    "title": "The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll",
    "edition": "Dresden Edition",
    "publisher": "C. P. Farrell",
    "year": 1900
  },
  "license": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/",
  "url": "https://thegreatagnostic.com/works/huxley-and-agnosticism/",
  "wordCount": 5445,
  "body": "IN the February number of the Nineteenth Century, 1889, is an article\nby Professor Huxley, entitled \"Agnosticism.\" It seems that a church\ncongress was held at Manchester in October, 1888, and that the Principal\nof King's College brought the topic of Agnosticism before the assembly\nand made the following statement:\n\n\"But if this be so, for a man to urge as an escape from this article\nof belief that he has no means of a scientific knowledge of an unseen\nworld, or of the future, is irrelevant. His difference from Christians\nlies, not in the fact that he has no knowledge of these things, but\nthat he does not believe the authority on which they are stated. He\nmay prefer to call himself an Agnostic, but his real name is an older\none—he is an infidel; that is to say, an unbeliever. The word infidel,\nperhaps, carries an unpleasant significance. Perhaps it is right that it\nshould. It is, and it ought to be, an unpleasant thing for a man to have\nto say plainly that he does not believe in Jesus Christ.\"\n\nLet us examine this statement, putting it in language that is easily\nunderstood; and for that purpose we will divide it into several\nparagraphs.\n\nFirst.—\"For a man to urge that he has no means of a scientific\nknowledge of the unseen world, or of the future, is irrelevant.\"\n\nIs there any other knowledge than a scientific knowledge? Are there\nseveral kinds of knowing? Is there such a thing as scientific ignorance?\nIf a man says, \"I know nothing of the unseen world because I have no\nknowledge upon that subject,\" is the fact that he has no knowledge\nabsolutely irrelevant? Will the Principal of King's College say that\nhaving no knowledge is the reason he knows? When asked to give your\nopinion upon any subject, can it be said that your ignorance of that\nsubject is irrelevant? If this be true, then your knowledge of the\nsubject is also irrelevant?\n\nIs it possible to put in ordinary English a more perfect absurdity? How\ncan a man obtain any knowledge of the unseen world? He certainly cannot\nobtain it through the medium of the senses. It is not a world that he\ncan visit. He cannot stand upon its shores, nor can he view them from\nthe ocean of imagination. The Principal of King's College, however,\ninsists that these impossibilities are irrelevant.\n\nNo person has come back from the unseen world. No authentic message has\nbeen delivered. Through all the centuries, not one whisper has broken\nthe silence that lies beyond the grave. Countless millions have sought\nfor some evidence, have listened in vain for some word.\n\nIt is most cheerfully admitted that all this does not prove the\nnon-existence of another world—all this does not demonstrate that death\nends all. But it is the justification of the Agnostic, who candidly\nsays, \"I do not know.\"\n\nSecond.—The Principal of King's College states that the difference\nbetween an Agnostic and a Christian \"lies, not in the fact that he has\nno knowledge of these things, but that he does not believe the authority\non which they are stated.\"\n\nIs this a difference in knowledge, or a difference in belief—that is to\nsay, a difference in credulity?\n\nThe Christian believes the Mosaic account. He reverently hears and\nadmits the truth of all that he finds within the Scriptures. Is this\nknowledge? How is it possible to know whether the reputed authors of the\nbooks of the Old Testament were the real ones? The witnesses are dead.\nThe lips that could testify are dust. Between these shores roll the\nwaves of many centuries. Who knows whether such a man as Moses existed\nor not? Who knows the author of Kings and Chronicles? By what testimony\ncan we substantiate the authenticity of the prophets, or of the\nprophecies, or of the fulfillments? Is there any difference between the\nknowledge of the Christian and of the Agnostic? Does the Principal of\nKing's College know any more as to the truth of the Old Testament than\nthe man who modestly calls for evidence? Has not a mistake been made? Is\nnot the difference one of belief instead of knowledge? And is not\nthis difference founded on the difference in credulity? Would not\nan infinitely wise and good being—where belief is a condition to\nsalvation—supply the evidence? Certainly the Creator of man—if such\nexist—knows the exact nature of the human mind—knows the evidence\nnecessary to convince; and, consequently, such a being would act in\naccordance with such conditions.\n\nThere is a relation between evidence and belief. The mind is so\nconstituted that certain things, being in accordance with its nature,\nare regarded as reasonable, as probable.\n\nThere is also this fact that must not be overlooked: that is, that just\nin the proportion that the brain is developed it requires more evidence,\nand becomes less and less credulous. Ignorance and credulity go hand in\nhand. Intelligence understands something of the law of average, has an\nidea of probability. It is not swayed by prejudice, neither is it driven\nto extremes by suspicion. It takes into consideration personal motives.\nIt examines the character of the witnesses, makes allowance for the\nignorance of the time,—for enthusiasm, for fear,—and comes to its\nconclusion without fear and without passion.\n\nWhat knowledge has the Christian of another world? The senses of the\nChristian are the same as those of the Agnostic.\n\nHe hears, sees, and feels substantially the same. His vision is limited.\nHe sees no other shore and hears nothing from another world.\n\nKnowledge is something that can be imparted. It has a foundation\nin fact. It comes within the domain of the senses. It can be told,\ndescribed, analyzed, and, in addition to all this, it can be classified.\nWhenever a fact becomes the property of one mind, it can become the\nproperty of the intellectual world. There are words in which the\nknowledge can be conveyed.\n\nThe Christian is not a supernatural person, filled with supernatural\ntruths. He is a natural person, and all that he knows of value can be\nnaturally imparted. It is within his power to give all that he has to\nthe Agnostic.\n\nThe Principal of King's College is mistaken when he says that the\ndifference between the Agnostic and the Christian does not lie in the\nfact that the Agnostic has no knowledge, \"but that he does not believe\nthe authority on which these things are stated.\"\n\nThe real difference is this: the Christian says that he has knowledge;\nthe Agnostic admits that he has none; and yet the Christian accuses the\nAgnostic of arrogance, and asks him how he has the impudence to admit\nthe limitations of his mind. To the Agnostic every fact is a torch, and\nby this light, and this light only, he walks.\n\nIt is also true that the Agnostic does not believe the authority relied\non by the Christian. What is the authority of the Christian? Thousands\nof years ago it is supposed that certain men, or, rather, uncertain men,\nwrote certain things. It is alleged by the Christian that these men were\ndivinely inspired, and that the words of these men are to be taken as\nabsolutely true, no matter whether or not they are verified by modern\ndiscovery and demonstration.\n\nHow can we know that any human being was divinely inspired? There has\nbeen no personal revelation to us to the effect that certain people were\ninspired—it is only claimed that the revelation was to them. For this\nwe have only their word, and about that there is this difficulty: we\nknow nothing of them, and, consequently, cannot, if we desire, rely upon\ntheir character for truth. This evidence is not simply hearsay—it\nis far weaker than that. We have only been told that they said these\nthings; we do not know whether the persons claiming to be inspired\nwrote these things or not; neither are we certain that such persons ever\nexisted. We know now that the greatest men with whom we are acquainted\nare often mistaken about the simplest matters. We also know that men\nsaying something like the same things, in other countries and in ancient\ndays, must have been impostors. The Christian has no confidence in the\nwords of Mohammed; the Mohammedan cares nothing about the declarations\nof Buddha; and the Agnostic gives to the words of the Christian the\nvalue only of the truth that is in them. He knows that these sayings get\nneither truth nor worth from the person who uttered them. He knows\nthat the sayings themselves get their entire value from the truth they\nexpress. So that the real difference between the Christian and the\nAgnostic does not lie in their knowledge,—for neither of them has any\nknowledge on this subject,—but the difference does lie in credulity,\nand in nothing else. The Agnostic does not rely on the authority of\nMoses and the prophets. He finds that they were mistaken in most matters\ncapable of demonstration. He finds that their mistakes multiply in the\nproportion that human knowledge increases. He is satisfied that the\nreligion of the ancient Jews is, in most things, as ignorant and cruel\nas other religions of the ancient world. He concludes that the efforts,\nin all ages, to answer the questions of origin and destiny, and to\naccount for the phenomena of life, have all been substantial failures.\n\nIn the presence of demonstration there is no opportunity for the\nexercise of faith. Truth does not appeal to credulity—it appeals to\nevidence, to established facts, to the constitution of the mind. It\nendeavors to harmonize the new fact with all that we know, and to bring\nit within the circumference of human experience.\n\nThe church has never cultivated investigation. It has never said: Let\nhim who has a mind to think, think; but its cry from the first until now\nhas been: Let him who has ears to hear, hear.\n\nThe pulpit does not appeal to the reason of the pew; it speaks by\nauthority and it commands the pew to believe, and it not only commands,\nbut it threatens.\n\nThe Agnostic knows that the testimony of man is not sufficient to\nestablish what is known as the miraculous. We would not believe to-day\nthe testimony of millions to the effect that the dead had been raised.\nThe church itself would be the first to attack such testimony. If we\ncannot believe those whom we know, why should we believe witnesses who\nhave been dead thousands of years, and about whom we know nothing?\n\nThird.—The Principal of King's College, growing somewhat severe,\ndeclares that \"he may prefer to call himself an Agnostic, but his real\nname is an older one—he is an infidel; that is to say, an unbeliever.\"\n\nThis is spoken in a kind of holy scorn. According to this gentleman, an\nunbeliever is, to a certain extent, a disreputable person.\n\nIn this sense, what is an unbeliever? He is one whose mind is so\nconstituted that what the Christian calls evidence is not satisfactory\nto him. Is a person accountable for the constitution of his mind, for\nthe formation of his brain? Is any human being responsible for the\nweight that evidence has upon him? Can he believe without evidence? Is\nthe weight of evidence a question of choice? Is there such a thing as\nhonestly weighing testimony? Is the result of such weighing necessary?\nDoes it involve moral responsibility? If the Mosaic account does not\nconvince a man that it is true, is he a wretch because he is candid\nenough to tell the truth? Can he preserve his manhood only by making a\nfalse statement?\n\nThe Mohammedan would call the Principal of King's College an\nunbeliever,—so would the tribes of Central Africa,—and he would return\nthe compliment, and all would be equally justified. Has the Principal of\nKing's College any knowledge that he keeps from the rest of the world?\nHas he the confidence of the Infinite? Is there anything praiseworthy in\nbelieving where the evidence is sufficient, or is one to be praised for\nbelieving only where the evidence is insufficient? Is a man to be blamed\nfor not agreeing with his fellow-citizen? Were the unbelievers in the\npagan world better or worse than their neighbors? It is probably true\nthat some of the greatest Greeks believed in the gods of that nation,\nand it is equally true that some of the greatest denied their existence.\nIf credulity is a virtue now, it must have been in the days of Athens.\nIf to believe without evidence entities one to eternal reward in this\ncentury, certainly the same must have been true in the days of the\nPharaohs.\n\nAn infidel is one who does not believe in the prevailing religion. We\nnow admit that the infidels of Greece and Rome were right. The gods that\nthey refused to believe in are dead. Their thrones are empty, and long\nago the sceptres dropped from their nerveless hands. To-day the world\nhonors the men who denied and derided these gods.\n\nFourth.—The Principal of King's College ventures to suggest that \"the\nword infidel, perhaps, carries an unpleasant significance; perhaps it is\nright that it should.\"\n\nA few years ago the word infidel did carry \"an unpleasant significance.\"\nA few years ago its significance was so unpleasant that the man to\nwhom the word was applied found himself in prison or at the stake. In\nparticularly kind communities he was put in the stocks, pelted with\noffal, derided by hypocrites, scorned by ignorance, jeered by cowardice,\nand all the priests passed by on the other side.\n\nThere was a time when Episcopalians were regarded as infidels; when a\ntrue Catholic looked upon a follower of Henry VIII. as an infidel, as\nan unbeliever; when a true Catholic held in detestation the man who\npreferred a murderer and adulterer—a man who swapped religions for the\nsake of exchanging wives—to the Pope, the head of the universal church.\n\nIt is easy enough to conceive of an honest man denying the claims of\na church based on the caprice of an English king. The word infidel\n\"carries an unpleasant significance\" only where the Christians are\nexceedingly ignorant, intolerant, bigoted, cruel, and unmannerly.\n\nThe real gentleman gives to others the rights that he claims for\nhimself. The civilized man rises far above the bigotry of one who has\nbeen \"born again.\" Good breeding is far gentler than \"universal love.\"\n\nIt is natural for the church to hate an unbeliever—natural for the\npulpit to despise one who refuses to subscribe, who refuses to give. It\nis a question of revenue instead of religion. The Episcopal Church has\nthe instinct of self-preservation. It uses its power, its influence, to\ncompel contribution. It forgives the giver.\n\nFifth.—The Principal of King's College insists that \"it is, and it\nought to be, an unpleasant thing for a man to have to say plainly that\nhe does not believe in Jesus Christ.\"\n\nShould it be an unpleasant thing for a man to say plainly what he\nbelieves? Can this be unpleasant except in an uncivilized community—a\ncommunity in which an uncivilized church has authority?\n\nWhy should not a man be as free to say that he does not believe as to\nsay that he does believe? Perhaps the real question is whether all men\nhave an equal right to express their opinions. Is it the duty of the\nminority to keep silent? Are majorities always right? If the minority\nhad never spoken, what to-day would have been the condition of this\nworld? Are the majority the pioneers of progress, or does the pioneer,\nas a rule, walk alone? Is it his duty to close his lips? Must the\ninventor allow his inventions to die in the brain? Must the discoverer\nof new truths make of his mind a tomb? Is man under any obligation to\nhis fellows? Was the Episcopal religion always in the majority? Was it\nat any time in the history of the world an unpleasant thing to be\ncalled a Protestant? Did the word Protestant \"carry an unpleasant\nsignificance\"? Was it \"perhaps right that it should\"? Was Luther a\nmisfortune to the human race?\n\nIf a community is thoroughly civilized, why should it be an unpleasant\nthing for a man to express his belief in respectful language? If the\nargument is against him, it might be unpleasant; but why should simple\nnumbers be the foundation of unpleasantness? If the majority have the\nfacts,—if they have the argument,—why should they fear the mistakes of\nthe minority? Does any theologian hate the man he can answer?\n\nIt is claimed by the Episcopal Church that Christ was in fact God; and\nit is further claimed that the New Testament is an inspired account of\nwhat that being and his disciples did and said. Is there any obligation\nresting on any human being to believe this account? Is it within the\npower of man to determine the influence that testimony shall have upon\nhis mind?\n\nIf one denies the existence of devils, does he, for that reason, cease\nto believe in Jesus Christ? Is it not possible to imagine that a great\nand tender soul living in Palestine nearly twenty centuries ago was\nmisunderstood? Is it not within the realm of the possible that his\nwords have been inaccurately reported? Is it not within the range of the\nprobable that legend and rumor and ignorance and zeal have deformed his\nlife and belittled his character?\n\nIf the man Christ lived and taught and suffered, if he was, in reality,\ngreat and noble, who is his friend—the one who attributes to him feats\nof jugglery, or he who maintains that these stories were invented by\nzealous ignorance and believed by enthusiastic credulity?\n\nIf he claimed to have wrought miracles, he must have been either\ndishonest or insane; consequently, he who denies miracles does what\nlittle he can to rescue the reputation of a great and splendid man.\n\nThe Agnostic accepts the good he did, the truth he said, and rejects\nonly that which, according to his judgment, is inconsistent with truth\nand goodness.\n\nThe Principal of King's College evidently believes in the necessity of\nbelief. He puts conviction or creed or credulity in place of character.\nAccording to his idea, it is impossible to win the approbation of God by\nintelligent investigation and by the expression of honest conclusions.\nHe imagines that the Infinite is delighted with credulity, with belief\nwithout evidence, faith without question.\n\nMan has but little reason, at best; but this little should be used. No\nmatter how small the taper is, how feeble the ray of light it casts, it\nis better than darkness, and no man should be rewarded for extinguishing\nthe light he has.\n\nWe know now, if we know anything, that man in this, the nineteenth\ncentury, is better capable of judging as to the happening of any event,\nthan he ever was before. We know that the standard is higher to-day—we\nknow that the intellectual light is greater—we know that the human mind\nis better equipped to deal with all questions of human interest, than at\nany other time within the known history of the human race.\n\nIt will not do to say that \"our Lord and his apostles must at least be\nregarded as honest men.\" Let this be admitted, and what does it prove?\nHonesty is not enough. Intelligence and honesty must go hand in hand.\nWe may admit now that \"our Lord and his apostles\" were perfectly honest\nmen; yet it does not follow that we have a truthful account of what they\nsaid and of what they did. It is not pretended that \"our Lord\" wrote\nanything, and it is not known that one of the apostles ever wrote\na word. Consequently, the most that we can say is that somebody has\nwritten something about \"our Lord and his apostles.\" Whether that\nsomebody knew or did not know is unknown to us. As to whether what is\nwritten is true or false, we must judge by that which is written.\n\nFirst of all, is it probable? is it within the experience of mankind?\nWe should judge of the gospels as we judge of other histories, of other\nbiographies. We know that many biographies written by perfectly honest\nmen are not correct. We know, if we know anything, that honest men can\nbe mistaken, and it is not necessary to believe everything that a man\nwrites because we believe he was honest. Dishonest men may write the\ntruth.\n\nAt last the standard or criterion is for each man to judge according to\nwhat he believes to be human experience. We are satisfied that nothing\nmore wonderful has happened than is now happening. We believe that\nthe present is as wonderful as the past, and just as miraculous as the\nfuture. If we are to believe in the truth of the Old Testament, the\nword evidence loses its meaning; there ceases to be any standard of\nprobability, and the mind simply accepts or denies without reason.\n\nWe are told that certain miracles were performed for the purpose of\nattesting the mission and character of Christ. How can these miracles\nbe verified? The miracles of the Middle Ages rest upon substantially the\nsame evidence. The same may be said of the wonders of all countries and\nof all ages. How is it a virtue to deny the miracles of Mohammed and to\nbelieve those attributed to Christ?\n\nYou may say of St. Augustine that what he said was true or false. We\nknow that much of it was false; and yet we are not justified in saying\nthat he was dishonest. Thousands of errors have been propagated by\nhonest men. As a rule, mistakes get their wings from honest people. The\ntestimony of a witness to the happening of the impossible gets no weight\nfrom the honesty of the witness. The fact that falsehoods are in the\nNew Testament does not tend to prove that the writers were knowingly\nuntruthful. No man can be honest enough to substantiate, to the\nsatisfaction of reasonable men, the happening of a miracle.\n\nFor this reason it makes not the slightest difference whether the\nwriters of the New Testament were honest or not. Their character is not\ninvolved. Whenever a man rises above his contemporaries, whenever he\nexcites the wonder of his fellows, his biographers always endeavor to\nbridge over the chasm between the people and this man, and for that\npurpose attribute to him the qualities which in the eyes of the\nmultitude are desirable.\n\nMiracles are demanded by savages, and, consequently, the savage\nbiographer attributes miracles to his hero. What would we think now of a\nman who, in writing the life of Charles Darwin, should attribute to him\nsupernatural powers? What would we say of an admirer of Humboldt who\nshould claim that the great German could cast out devils? We would feel\nthat Darwin and Humboldt had been belittled; that the biographies were\nwritten for children and by men who had not outgrown the nursery.\n\nIf the reputation of \"our Lord\" is to be preserved—if he is to stand\nwith the great and splendid of the earth—if he is to continue a\nconstellation in the intellectual heavens, all claim to the miraculous,\nto the supernatural, must be abandoned.\n\nNo one can overestimate the evils that have been endured by the human\nrace by reason of a departure from the standard of the natural. The\nworld has been governed by jugglery, by sleight-of-hand. Miracles,\nwonders, tricks, have been regarded as of far greater importance than\nthe steady, the sublime and unbroken march of cause and effect. The\nimprobable has been established by the impossible. Falsehood has\nfurnished the foundation for faith.\n\nIs the human body at present the residence of evil spirits, or have\nthese imps of darkness perished from the world? Where are they? If the\nNew Testament establishes anything, it is the existence of innumerable\ndevils, and that these satanic beings absolutely took possession of\nthe human mind. Is this true? Can anything be more absurd? Does any\nintellectual man who has examined the question believe that depraved\ndemons live in the bodies of men? Do they occupy space? Do they live\nupon some kind of food? Of what shape are they? Could they be classified\nby a naturalist? Do they run or float or fly? If to deny the existence\nof these supposed beings is to be an infidel, how can the word infidel\n\"carry an unpleasant significance\"?\n\nOf course it is the business of the principals of most colleges, as well\nas of bishops, cardinals, popes, priests, and clergymen to insist upon\nthe existence of evil spirits. All these gentlemen are employeed to\ncounteract the influence of these supposed demons. Why should they take\nthe bread out of their own mouths? Is it to be expected that they will\nunfrock themselves?\n\nThe church, like any other corporation, has the instinct of\nself-preservation. It will defend itself; it will fight as long as it\nhas the power to change a hand into a fist.\n\nThe Agnostic takes the ground that human experience is the basis of\nmorality. Consequently, it is of no importance who wrote the gospels,\nor who vouched or vouches for the genuineness of the miracles. In his\nscheme of life these things are utterly unimportant. He is satisfied\nthat \"the miraculous\" is the impossible. He knows that the witnesses\nwere wholly incapable of examining the questions involved, that\ncredulity had possession of their minds, that \"the miraculous\" was\nexpected, that it was their daily food.\n\nAll this is very clearly and delightfully stated by Professor Huxley,\nand it hardly seems possible that any intelligent man can read what he\nsays without feeling that the foundation of all superstition has\nbeen weakened. The article is as remarkable for its candor as for its\nclearness. Nothing is avoided—everything is met. No excuses are given..\nHe has left all apologies for the other side. When you have finished\nwhat Professor Huxley has written, you feel that your mind has been\nin actual contact with the mind of another, that nothing has been\nconcealed; and not only so, but you feel that this mind is not only\nwilling, but anxious, to know the actual truth.\n\nTo me, the highest uses of philosophy are, first, to free the mind of\nfear, and, second, to avert all the evil that can be averted, through\nintelligence—that is to say, through a knowledge of the conditions of\nwell-being.\n\nWe are satisfied that the absolute is beyond our vision, beneath our\ntouch, above our reach. We are now convinced that we can deal only with\nphenomena, with relations, with appearances, with things that impress\nthe senses, that can be reached by reason, by the exercise of our\nfaculties. We are satisfied that the reasonable road is \"the straight\nroad,\" the only \"sacred way.\"\n\nOf course there is faith in the world—faith in this world—and always\nwill be, unless superstition succeeds in every land. But the faith of\nthe wise man is based upon facts. His faith is a reasonable conclusion\ndrawn from the known. He has faith in the progress of the race, in the\ntriumph of intelligence, in the coming sovereignty of science. He has\nfaith in the development of the brain, in the gradual enlightenment of\nthe mind. And so he works for the accomplishment of great ends, having\nfaith in the final victory of the race.\n\nHe has honesty enough to say that he does not know. He perceives and\nadmits that the mind has limitations. He doubts the so-called wisdom of\nthe past. He looks for evidence, and he endeavors to keep his mind\nfree from prejudice. He believes in the manly virtues, in the judicial\nspirit, and in his obligation to tell his honest thoughts.\n\nIt is useless to talk about a destruction of consolations. That which is\nsuspected to be untrue loses its power to console. A man should be brave\nenough to bear the truth.\n\nProfessor Huxley has stated with great clearness the attitude of\nthe Agnostic. It seems that he is somewhat severe on the Positive\nPhilosophy, While it is hard to see the propriety of worshiping Humanity\nas a being, it is easy to understand the splendid dream of August Comte.\nIs the human race worthy to be worshiped by itself—that is to say,\nshould the individual worship himself? Certainly the religion of\nhumanity is better than the religion of the inhuman. The Positive\nPhilosophy is better far than Catholicism. It does not fill the heavens\nwith monsters, nor the future with pain.\n\nIt may be said that Luther and Comte endeavored to reform the Catholic\nChurch. Both were mistaken, because the only reformation of which that\nchurch is capable is destruction. It is a mass of superstition.\n\nThe mission of Positivism is, in the language of its founder, \"to\ngeneralize science and to systematize sociality.\" It seems to me that\nComte stated with great force and with absolute truth the three phases\nof intellectual evolution or progress.\n\nFirst.—\"In the supernatural phase the mind seeks causes—aspires to\nknow the essence of things, and the How and Why of their operation. In\nthis phase, all facts are regarded as the productions of supernatural\nagents, and unusual phenomena are interpreted as the signs of the\npleasure or displeasure of some god.\"\n\nHere at this point is the orthodox world of to-day. The church still\nimagines that phenomena should be interpreted as the signs of the\npleasure or displeasure of God. Nearly every history is deformed with\nthis childish and barbaric view.\n\nSecond.—The next phase or modification, according to Comte, is the\nmetaphysical. \"The supernatural agents are dispensed with, and in\ntheir places we find abstract forces or entities supposed to inhere in\nsubstances and capable of engendering phenomena.\"\n\nIn this phase people talk about laws and principles as though laws and\nprinciples were forces capable of producing phenomena.\n\nThird.—\"The last stage is the Positive. The mind, convinced of the\nfutility of all enquiry into causes and essences, restricts itself to\nthe observation and classification of phenomena, and to the discovery of\nthe invariable relations of succession and similitude—in a word, to the\ndiscovery of the relations of phenomena.\"\n\nWhy is not the Positive stage the point reached by the Agnostic? He\nhas ceased to inquire into the origin of things. He has perceived the\nlimitations of the mind. He is thoroughly convinced of the uselessness\nand futility and absurdity of theological methods, and restricts himself\nto the examination of phenomena, to their relations, to their effects,\nand endeavors to find in the complexity of things the true conditions of\nhuman happiness.\n\nAlthough I am not a believer in the philosophy of Auguste Comte, I\ncannot shut my eyes to the value of his thought; neither is it possible\nfor me not to applaud his candor, his intelligence, and the courage\nit required even to attempt to lay the foundation of the Positive\nPhilosophy.\n\nProfessor Huxley and Frederic Harrison are splendid soldiers in the\narmy of Progress. They have attacked with signal success the sacred and\nsolemn stupidities of superstition. Both have appealed to that which is\nhighest and noblest in man. Both have been the destroyers of prejudice.\nBoth have shed light, and both have won great victories on the fields\nof intellectual conflict. They cannot afford to waste time in attacking\neach other.\n\nAfter all, the Agnostic and the Positivist have the same end in\nview—both believe in living for this world.\n\nThe theologians, finding themselves unable to answer the arguments\nthat have been urged, resort to the old subterfuge—to the old cry that\nAgnosticism takes something of value from the life of man. Does the\nAgnostic take any consolation from the world? Does he blot out, or dim,\none star in the heaven of hope? Can there be anything more consoling\nthan to feel, to know, that Jehovah is not God—that the message of the\nOld Testament is not from the infinite?\n\nIs it not enough to fill the brain with a happiness unspeakable to know\nthat the words, \"Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire,\" will\nnever be spoken to one of the children of men?\n\nIs it a small thing to lift from the shoulders of industry the burdens\nof superstition? Is it a little thing to drive the monster of fear from\nthe hearts of men?—North American Review, April, 1889.\n"
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